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THE EVOLVING LAW OF
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION IN
JAPANESE CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CONTEXT, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITY
Carl F. Goodman*
INTRODUCTION

I

n 1996, Japan enacted a new Civil Procedure Code as part of its judicial reform effort (the “1996 Code”).1 It was, to a great extent, a
rewrite of the old Japanese Civil Procedure Code (the “Old Code”)2 in
the modern Japanese used by the general public.3 The 1996 Code did,
however, make several substantial changes. The most significant addressed procedures dealing with the production of evidence, particularly
those dealing with document production.4 One new provision expanded
the scope of documents available for production, but also restricted expansion so that a document prepared solely for the use of the party in
possession of the document (a “self-use document”) was excluded from
production.5 This change represented a compromise between those who
argued for open production of relevant documents and those who argued
for retention of the old rule wherein only documents that met three specific statutory criteria were available for production. It was anticipated

* Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University Law Center (Japan/US Comparative
Law) and George Washington University Law School (Law in Japan); Former Professor
at Hiroshima University Hogakubu Faculty; Brooklyn Law School J.D. (1960); Georgetown University Law Center L.L.M. (1965).
1. MINSOHŌ [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 109 of 1996, translated in 7 EHS
LAW BULL. SER. no. 2300 (2007) [hereinafter MINSOHŌ]. The 1996 Code was adopted in
1996 and came into effect in 1998.
2. KYŪ-MINSOHŌ [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 29 of 1890, translated in 2
EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2300 (2007) [hereinafter KYŪ-MINSOHŌ].
3. See Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561, 563
(2001) (“The old Code of Civil procedure of 1926 . . . was basically a streamlined version
of the Code of 1890, which was in turn basically a translation of the German Code of
Civil Procedure of 1877.”).
4. Some of the specific changes included the creation of a new preparation for oral
argument procedure that permitted parties to engage in private discussions with the court
before entering the public oral argument phase of the case, MINSOHŌ, arts. 168–74, a new
inquiry procedure loosely modeled after American interrogatories but without any sanction or compulsion requiring answers to inquiries, MINSOHŌ, art. 163, and a loosening of
the procedural requirements that needed to be met as part of a motion to require that a
party or third person produce documents to be used in litigation. MINSOHŌ, art. 222.
5. MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4.
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that the judicial system would articulate the parameters of this compromise in actual litigations.
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Japan decided Fuji Bank v. Maeda,6 a
case that broadly interpreted the self-use document exception and severely restricted the right to obtain documents from a recalcitrant party.
Both lawyers (bengoshi7 as well as foreign lawyers) and judges read Fuji
Bank as a broad application of the self-use document exception excluding from production corporate documents prepared by employees for inhouse use and restricted from distribution outside the corporation.8 Nonetheless, Japanese bengoshi continued to press lower courts to order the
production of in-house corporate documents. Over time, these cases
reached the Supreme Court, which, through a series of decisions interpreting the self-use exception, has moderated the reach of Fuji Bank.
Consequently, although greater production of documents is now possible
than was originally thought permissible under Fuji Bank, the recent series of cases has introduced added complexity as to how broadly or narrowly the Court will interpret the self-use document exception to production.
It is the purpose of this Article to update a 2003 study of the 1996
Code, with special focus on the document production article of the 1996
Code and the Supreme Court of Japan’s evolving self-use document ju-

6. See Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.
2.html.
7. A bengoshi, the rough equivalent of the American lawyer, is licensed to represent
parties in litigation before all courts in Japan. Bengoshi must belong to a bar association
and are subject to a special law known as the bengoshi-ho.
8. See John O. Haley, Heisei Renewal or Heisei Transformation: Are Legal Reforms
Really Changing Japan?, 19 J. JAPAN. L. 5, 6 n.6 (2005) [hereinafter Haley, Heisei Renewal]. Haley notes:
The new Code of Civil Procedure . . . is perhaps better described as a revision
rather than a reform. The new code was designed as a linguistic up-dating of
the code to make it more accessible to contemporary readers. The new version
made hardly any substantive changes. Among the few was to be a broadening
of discovery. However, whatever the intended changes may have been, in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in K.K. Fuji Bank v. Maeda . . . denying discovery of a bank memo evaluating a loan application as an “internal” memo
under [MINSOHŌ] article 220(4)(c), the most significant preexisting limits on
discovery appear to remain.
Id.
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risprudence in the ten years since the 1996 Code was adopted.9 Although
proceeding cautiously, the Court appears to be relaxing the rules governing document production to allow parties greater access to documents
where production will not have a seriously detrimental effect on the operations of the producing entity—while simultaneously creating a doctrine that supports Japanese customs and community values.
This Article contains three parts. Part I provides a background of the
Japanese civil litigation system so that the cases that address document
production issues may be placed in a litigation perspective. Part II discusses the Supreme Court decisions dealing with document production
under the 1996 Code. Finally, Part III discusses the contextual, cultural,
and community rationale that underlays and supports the decisions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A Civil and Common Law Hybrid
The modern Japanese legal system’s structure resembles that of civil
law systems.10 Like other civil law systems, its fundamental laws are
contained in codes. The centerpiece of the Japanese system is the Civil
Code.11 The basic law of civil procedure is the Civil Procedure Code,
which was re-written in 1996.12 But Japan’s version of the civil law system has always been somewhat different from the classical civil law systems represented by the Napoleonic Code, where, consistent with the
equality notion of the Revolution, the law was to be easily understood by

9. See Carl F. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure Code: Has it Fostered a Rule
of Law Dispute Resolution Mechanism?, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 511 (2004) [hereinafter
Goodman, Japan].
10. For a general discussion of the civil law system, see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN,
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1977) (1957); ARTHUR TAYLOR
VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (1977).
11. KYU-MINSOHŌ [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 29 of 1890. Although there
are five basic codes in Japan (Civil Code, Criminal Code, Commercial Code, Code of
Civil Procedure, and Code of Criminal Procedure), the Constitution is usually referred to
as part of the compilation of the Six Codes.
12. For a discussion of the process and substantive changes made by the 1996 Code,
see Takeshi Kojima, Symposium Honoring Professor Robert C. Casad: Japanese Civil
Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 KAN. L. REV. 687 (1998); Toshiro M.
Mochizuki, Baby Step or Giant Leap?: Parties’ Expanded Access to Documentary Evidence Under the New Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 285, 294–
299 (1999); Ota, supra note 3, at 568–70; Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil
Procedure of Japan—A Procedure for the Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767
(1997).
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all people,13 and the German Civil Code, where the law was considered a
science.14 Nonetheless, Japan’s civil law system retains the fundamental
elements of a civil law system (as distinguished from a common law system):
(i)

Codes are the law, whereas judicial decisions, while
useful in teaching how judges have interpreted the
Codes in the past, are not law.15

(ii)

Judges are part of a civil service government bureaucracy and their duty is to apply the law as found
in the Codes, rather than using their authority to
make their own law.

(iii)

Procedure follows the inquest model rather than the
adversary model of the common law system. As a
consequence, the judge is in charge of fact-finding
and is the central figure in all courtroom dramas,
while the role of the attorney is marginalized.16 In
Japan, the classical inquest, wherein the judge may
take evidence ex officio, has been modified to require that the parties suggest witnesses to be called,

13. VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 10, at 48–53 (“On July 5, 1790, the Constituent Assembly voted ‘that the civil laws would be reviewed and reformed by the legislators and that there would be made a general code of laws simple, clear and appropriate
to the constitution.’”)
14. See generally Carl Steenstrup, German Reception of Roman Law and Japanese
Reception of German Law, 1 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 273, (1991). See also
VON MEHREN & GORDELY, supra note 10, at 59–68. As a consequence of American influence after World War II, the current legal system has many common law aspects, rendering it in some respects a hybrid system with a decided emphasis on the Civil Law. See
infra notes 43–44.
15. See Kaoru Yunoki, Hanrei Kenkyū No Mokuteki To Hōhō [Objectives and Methods of Studies of Precedents], 16 HŌ-SHAKAIGAKU KENKYŪ 1, 3–5 (1964), translated in
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 150–51 (Hideo Tanaka ed., Univ. of Tokyo Press 1976)
(“A judgment is after all a solution of a dispute between individuals, which is particularistic in nature, and does not establish a general rule which is applicable to all persons.
This applies also to a judgment of the Supreme Court, even one entered by its grand
bench.”); Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 424, 426 (1967).
16. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1021 (1998) (“The central task in a civil
law adjudication is for the judge to identify the legal and factual issues involved and to
decide them correctly.”).
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leaving the decision whether to call such witnesses
to the judge. Moreover, the function of the judge
encompasses the duty of the State to assure that the
party in the “right” prevails in litigation.17
(iv)

Preclusion rules are an autonomous regime, separate from the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, a
higher court’s ruling is binding on the lower court
only in the case in which it is rendered, and is not
binding on lower courts in other cases.18

(v)

Trials are not seen as the end product of a long road
involving a separate pre-trial discovery procedure.
Rather, trials are seen as a seamless sequence of
meetings, evidence gathering, witness testimony
taking, etc., constituting one “plenary proceeding,”
at the conclusion of which the judge, having “clarified” the facts and issues, gives her decision.19

(vi)

The first-level appeal is seen as a continuation of
the trial. New evidence and arguments may be presented if doing so will lead to a correct decision,20
unlike the appellate review of the trial court record
in the common law system. Second-level appeal is

17. Id. (“Under the civil law procedural systems, the judge is responsible for deciding
a case according to the truth of the matter . . . [and] eliciting relevant evidence.”).
18. See MINSOHŌ, arts. 114, 115. Indeed, in cases where the judgment awarded damages to be paid over time, where there are significantly changed circumstances, it is possible to initiate a new suit to lower or increase the amount awarded to take account of the
changed circumstances. See MINSOHŌ, art. 117.
19. The Japanese trial or “plenary hearing” is broken into parts—a preliminary oral
argument stage, which is like a traditional trial, and a second stage, where witness testimony and documents are presented. See MINSOHŌ, arts. 148, 164–67. Both the preliminary oral argument and the oral argument stages are part of the continuous, plenary hearing. The 1996 Code introduced another procedure, the preparation for oral argument,
which is less formal and is also less open to public view. This stage is designed to move
cases more quickly and to encourage early settlements. See Ota, supra note 3, at 568–70.
For a general discussion of Japanese procedure, see CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (2004) [hereinafter GOODMAN, JUSTICE].
20. See Akira Mikazuki, Saibansho Seido [Judicial System], 5 NIHONKOKU KEMPŌ
TAIKEI 73 (J. Tanaka ed., 1962), translated in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note
15, at 444, 465–68. For a chart showing the percentage of cases where the first level appeal court received new evidence in the form of witness testimony on appeal, see
GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 436.
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seen as a review of the case to correct errors made
by the lower court, unlike the role of American
highest courts, which resolve splits among courts
within their jurisdiction to ensure uniformity.21
Nonetheless, the Japanese system has retained elements that in one
way or another mirror notions of common law or customary law systems.22 For example, while the Commercial Code trumps the Civil Code
when it comes to commercial matters, issues not resolved by the Commercial Code are determined by commercial custom.23 Only in the absence of such custom does the Civil Code come into play.24 Thus, the
provisions of the Civil Code that determine whether a written document
is required for a contract (generally it is not, as there is no general statute
against frauds in the civil law system) are not applied when the commercial custom in the industry favors written contracts.25 In addition, mediation, conciliation, and negotiation are the preferred means of dispute
resolution, rather than the invocation of the state’s coercive power
through the organized judiciary.26 The assistance of the judiciary may,
21. Compare BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 11 (2d ed. 1909) (describing the court’s function as
“not of declaring justice between man and man, but of settling the law.”), with Masako
Kamiya, Narrowing the Avenues to Japan’s Supreme Court: The Policy Implications of
Japan’s Code of Civil Procedure Reforms, 4 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 53, 64 (2002) (noting
that the American system of limited review may not lead to a “just” result).
22. See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 59 (“Custom is to regulate a
transaction if it is found that the parties either explicitly or impliedly acted upon it, so
long as such custom is not repugnant to public policy. . . . If the custom in question is so
well established that the people concerned regard it as ipso facto binding upon them, it is
called customary law (kanshū hō) and is applied without the necessity of an allegation by
either party.”).
23. See SHŌHŌ [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 1, translated in EHS
LAW BULL. SER. no. 2200 (2001).
24. See id.
25. CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 360–
61 (2003) [hereinafter, GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW ]. Goodman explains:
Thus, while in the case of a soy-bean contract a writing may not be required
because the custom in the industry is to do things orally, a contract will be required in certain real estate transactions, not because the Code says a contract is
required but because it is the customary thing to do.
Id.
26. For a discussion of the role of conciliation, see DAN FENNO HENDERSON,
CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MODERN, 2 vols. (1965). See also
Masayuki Yoshida, Discussion Paper, The Reluctant Japanese Litigant: A “New”
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however, be invoked to facilitate the process of conciliation and settlement.27 And, finally, consistent with Emperor Meiji’s Charter Oath,28
which called for a break with the evils of the past and for determinations
based on the just laws of nature, Japanese judges are not immune from
the temptation to create legal rules based on reason rather than the letter
of the law.29
B. History
The Japanese version of the civil law system was adopted in the late
nineteenth century as a step towards modernization of the legal system.
Although the ruling class did not believe that the codes borrowed from
France and Germany represented either pre-existing Japanese customary
rules or legal ideals, they recognized that they must convince the Western imperialist powers that Japan’s legal system was civilized.30
Assessment, ELEC. J. CONTEMP. JUST. STUD. 5 (2003), available at http://www.japanese
studies.org.uk/discussionpapers/Yoshida.html (“In Japan there appears to be a preference
for mediation and conciliation. This is in sharp contrast to how similar disputes might be
settled in the United States and elsewhere in the Western world, where some forms of
legal proceedings would constitute an initial position.”); Alan Macfarlane, Law and Custom in Japan: Some Comparative Reflections, 10(3) CONTINUITY & CHANGE 369 (1995),
available at http://alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/law&custom.pdf (“[I]n 1987 ‘roughly one
third of all civil lawsuits in the first instance (district court) are concluded as default
judgments or withdrawal of complaints[,] . . . another third are contested judgments; . . .
the remain[der] are in-court compromises.’ There are various theories . . . to account for
this preference for conciliation.”).
27. See MINJI CHŌTEIHŌ [Law for Conciliation of Civil Affairs], Law No. 222 of
1950, translated in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2360 (1999). See also Kota Fukui, Justice
System Reform in Japan: The Connection Between Conflict Management and Realization
of General Rules of Law, 51 OSAKA U. L. REV. 55, 55 n.3, 66–67, 74 (2004); GOODMAN,
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 398–406; Shunko Muto, Concerning Trial Leadership in Litigation: Focusing on the Judge’s Inquiry and Compromise, 12 LAW IN JAPAN 23 (1979);
Tetsuya Obuchi, The Role of the Court in the Process of Informal Dispute Resolution in
Japan: Traditional and Modern Aspects, With Special Emphasis on In-Court Compromise, 20 LAW IN JAPAN 74, 75 (1987); Chin Kim & Craig M. Lawson, The Law of the
Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception of Law, 28 INT’L & COMP. L.
QUARTERLY 491, 507–08 (1979) (“Conciliation procedures, however, are not exclusively
extra-judicial, but are now also an important part of the enacted procedural law.”).
28. For a translation of the Charter Oath of Five Articles (1868), see W.W. MCLAREN,
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS VOL. 1 8 n.1 (Univ. Publications of America, reprint
ed., 1979).
29. See YOSHIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 222–24 (Anthony H.
Angelo trans. & ed., 1976) (1966).
30. The adoption of the Civil Law system was a part of Japan’s modernization during
the Meiji era and was an essential step in the renegotiation of the unequal treaties under
which Japan had lost a great deal of her sovereignty to the Western powers. See Harald
Hohmann, Modern Japanese Law: Legal History and the Concept of Law: Public Law
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The first step to modernization was quite natural—a look to the Chinese legal system that had been the font of Japanese law beginning in the
seventh century.31 However, it was quickly realized that borrowing Chinese legal rules would not achieve the objective sought by the ruling
class: to regain Japanese sovereignty that had been wrested away by the
imperialist Western powers through treaties that stripped Japan of various sovereign powers.32 The Westerners, who applied extraterritoriality
and Consular Courts to China, would not undo these institutions in Japan
if Chinese law was adopted as Japanese law. Thus, the natural second
step was to find and adopt a Western legal system that would convince
the Western imperialist powers that Japan had a modern, civilized legal
system.33
As an initial matter, Japan’s leaders were split between the civil law
system of France and the common law system of England. French law
was being taught at the law school created at the Ministry of Justice, giving members of the French School a decided advantage in its influence
on Japanese legal thinking.34 Common law, on the other hand, resembled
Tokugawa principles in some respects, as the Tokugawa Magistrates had,
at least in the later days of the Shogunate, been attempting to create some

and Economic Law of Japan, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 151, 155 (1996) (in discussing Wilhelm
Rohl’s explanation of the Westernization process of Japanese law: “Since these ‘unequal
treaties’ were criticized as threats to Japan’s full sovereignty by many Japanese, the Emperor saw only one chance to modify them; by establishing an European legal order in
Japan—this was often regarded as a prerequisite for a modification of these treaties by
those foreigners . . . .”).
31. See generally PAUL HENG-CHAO CH’EN, THE FORMATION OF THE EARLY MEIJI
LEGAL ORDER: THE JAPANESE CODE OF 1871 AND ITS CHINESE FOUNDATION (1981). See
also Hohmann, supra note 30, at 155.
32. For example, such treaties had the effect of nullifying Japanese ability to raise the
unreasonably low tariffs on imported products that had destroyed the Japanese monetary
system. They also placed Westerners in charge of legal matters involving their own citizens through extraterritoriality provisions and the creation of “Consular Courts.” See
Hohmann, supra note 30, at 155.
33. See DANIEL V. BOTSMAN, PUNISHMENT AND POWER IN THE MAKING OF MODERN
JAPAN 144–45 (Princeton Univ. Press 2005) (“The new Chinese-style penal code certainly did nothing to help the Japanese leader’s cause. . . . [I]t was precisely in order to
protect British subjects from Chinese laws that the institution of extraterritoriality had
been introduced to East Asia in the first place.”).
34. A French school of law was established in the Ministry of Justice in 1873 and an
Academy of French Law was established in 1876. See HENG-CHAO CH’EN, supra note 31,
at 72–73; HIDEO TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 201–03 (1976); Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961, in LAW IN
JAPAN, THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 5, 27 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed.,
1963).
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systematic rules based on the decisions reached by the Magistrates.35 A
vibrant English School objected to the French-inspired Civil Code, and
was supported by nationalists who, for entirely different reasons, opposed the new Civil Code.36 A Francophile Civil Code was written (with
the assistance of French legal scholars) but the English School was successful in postponing its final adoption.
With the adoption of a Germanized Constitution and the ascendance of
German legal thinking in Japan,37 the Civil Code was rewritten to adopt
the German style, while retaining some French elements.38 The family
law and inheritance provisions, which applied to all Japanese society,
were written to embody the family law system of the Samurai class (the
ie).39 While the Criminal Procedure Code retained a French orientation,
the Code of Civil Procedure was based on the German Civil Procedure
Code.40
Yet before the adoption of Western codes, an indigenous judicial system was required to deal with cases that were not within the jurisdiction
of the Consular Courts. Judges needed guidance as to how to approach
cases until written laws governing the entire array of anticipated problems could be adopted. The ruling oligarchs found the answer to this dilemma in the use of custom and reason as a foundational principle for

35. See Steenstrup, supra note 14, at 282.
36. See Shinichiro Michida assisted by Robert Braucher, The Legal Structure for
Economic Enterprise: Some Aspects of Japanese Commercial Law, in LAW IN JAPAN,
THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 507, 512 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed.,
1963); Steenstrup, supra note 14, at 284. Professor Noda notes that in the early stage of
westernization, Japan looked to French law; this was ultimately superseded by German
influences. See NODA, supra note 29, at 194–208.
37. The German legal thinking was perhaps influenced in part by the Prussian victory
in the Franco-Prussian War, but certainly influenced by Ito Hirabuni’s preference for a
German—as opposed to either a French or English—constitutional regime. Ito Hirabuni
was the head of the Japanese Constitution writing committee and a prominent figure in
the government during the Meiji era.
38. See Wilhelm Röhl, Generalities, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868 1–28
(Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005). For a discussion of the Code debate and history, see Ronald
Frank, Civil Code, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868 172–88 (Wilhelm Röhl ed.,
2005).
39. See V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE 28 (1992) (“Japan’s historical form of family organization is called ie. . . . In Japanese family life ie
refers to the descent group to which an individual belongs. The ie continues backward
and forward in time, and the living family members are but a representative of the underlying lineal genealogy.”)
40. For a discussion of the adoption of the Western codes in the context of the renegotiation of the “unequal treaties,” see Frank, supra note 38, at 169 and GOODMAN,
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 49–71.
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judicial decisions.41 Naturally, reason required the judge to find what was
considered a fair, reasonable, and appropriate determination—much as
the Tokugawa Magistrate had done. When the Western codes were
adopted as Japanese law, pre-war judges continued to utilize custom and
reason in their decision-making.42
The defeat of Japan and the subsequent Occupation,43 headed by
Americans with a decided preference for the common law, as well as the
adoption of a constitution infused with common law thinking, brought
about corresponding changes in the Civil Procedure Code and the judicial system. Echoing the U.S. Constitution, Japan established a single
41. See Wilhelm Röhl, Law of Civil Procedure, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE
1868 665 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005) (According to general principles of adjudication, as
set forth by decree of the dajōkan in 1875, “[j]udgment of civil cases shall be rendered
according to custom in the absence of law; and in the absence of custom they shall be
decided according to reason.”).
42. The Western Codes were adopted over a period of years after the Meiji Restoration. The process was complete before World War I and the judges before, and even after,
World War II continued to use custom and reason in their decisions. See NODA, supra
note 29, at 223–24. Tom Ginsberg comments:
Particularly whenever a clear answer was not to be found, the judges would
utilize the (pre-Meiji) notion of ‘judicial reason’ to find that particular Western
norms ought to be adopted as logical rules. This adaptation played an important
role in transforming the normative basis of Japanese law.
Tom Ginsberg, Japanese Legal Reform in Historical Perspective 23 (October 8,
2002) (unpublished article), www.law.uiuc.edu/academics/asianlaw/pdfs/JapaneseLegal
ReforminHistoricalPerspective-revised.pdf. In a similar vein, Seigo Hirowatari observes:
By this I mean a phenomenon wherein social relations are not established in
terms of rights and duties, but by traditional, social norms: norms dictated by
moral and social obligation (giri) and personal emotion (ninjo), which are indefinite and based primarily upon the customary practices of communities. The
result is that social conflicts are mostly solved without resort to the courts. This
phenomenon was explicitly identified as a ‘problem to be overcome’ in the
immediate aftermath of World War II . . . .
Seigo Hirowatari, Post-War Japan and the Law: Mapping Discourses of Legalization and
Modernization, 3 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 155, 156 (2000).
43. Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan accepted the
Potsdam Declaration and unconditionally surrendered to the Allies. American military
forces under General MacArthur occupied the main islands of Japan. Although nominally
an “Allied Occupation,” the reality was that the American forces were in control of the
Occupation, while Japan retained a form of government with a Cabinet and a Diet that
could pass laws. Legislation was subject to Occupation approval and the government
adopted many laws in compliance with Occupation goals. Included among the laws proposed by the American Occupation was the current Japanese Constitution. See
GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 75–160.
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judicial system headed by a Supreme Court with authority to handle all
cases of both public and private law. Although the constitution prohibits
the creation of specialized public law courts, such as an administrative
court or a constitutional court that are a mainstay of most civil law systems,44 the Japanese judicial system created panels at the trial court level
(district courts) to ensure that specialist judges with knowledge of the
administrative climate and administrative law hear administrative law
cases.
C. The Function of Japanese Judges and Attorneys
The quintessential American common law idea of judicial review enshrined in Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. Madison is granted to the
Japanese court system by the Japanese Constitution.45 But in a system
rooted in a narrow doctrine of preclusion that forswears stare decisis, the
question of what exactly a finding of unconstitutionality in one case
means for future cases is unclear.46 Moreover, a court system that lacks
the power of contempt or any substitute to enforce its orders without assistance from the public prosecutor is unlikely to aggressively pursue its
judicial review power—as is the case with the Japanese Supreme Court.
In over fifty years, it has held laws unconstitutional in only seven cases.47
44. See KENPŌ, art. 76, para. 2.
45. KENPŌ, art. 81 (“The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”).
46. See HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES
108–110 (1989); Ichiro Kitamura, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Japan, 25
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 263, 277 (1993).
47. See, e.g. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 KEISHŪ 265, (Sup. Ct., Apr. 4, 1973) translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1973.04.04-1970-A-No.1310
.html (holding unconstitutional Japan’s Patricide Law, which was enacted as part of the
support system for the old feudal family law system that venerated ancestors); Sumiyoshi
v. Governor of Hiroshima, 29 MINSHŪ 572 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 30, 1975) translation available
at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1975.04.30-1968-Gyo-Tsu-No.120.
html (holding unconstitutional a law that prohibited locating pharmacies near each other
violated the right to choose an occupation when the law had no basis other than to stifle
competition); Hiraguchi v. Hiraguchi, 41 MINSHŪ 408 (Sup. Ct., Apr 22, 1987) translated
in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIRSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970
THROUGH 1990 327, 329 (1996) (holding unconstitutional as a violation of property rights
the pre-war law that permitted division of a forest by a greater-than-fifty-percent owner
but not by a less-than-fifty-percent owner); Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election
Comm’n, 30 MINSHŪ 223 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 4, 1976) translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER &
HIRSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 355, 363
(1996) (holding unconstitutional certain voter disparities that denied equality to those
who lived in populous districts where their votes counted for less than those living in
sparsely populated districts); Kanao v. Hiroshima Prefecture Election Comm’n, 39
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During the Occupation, the Old Code was amended to provide a
greater role for attorneys. The Occupation objected to the dominant paternalistic Japanese judge; thus, the role of the judge was subordinated to
attorneys’ examination and cross-examination.48 Although the Old Code
was amended during the American Occupation to include crossexamination provisions and appeared to place lawyers at the front of the
litigation process,49 the reality was that post-war Japanese lawyers were
untrained in adversary trial methods, which conflicted with the norms of
harmony and avoidance of conflict in Japanese society. Moreover, Japanese judges did not change their ways simply because the Code placed

MINSHŪ 1100 (Sup. Ct., July 17, 1985) translation available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1985.07.17-1984-Gyo-Tsu-No.339.html
(holding unconstitutional certain voter disparities that denied equality to those who lived
in populous districts where their votes counted for less than those living in sparsely populated districts); Case No. 1767 of 1999, 56 MINSHŪ 1439 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 11, 2002) translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2002.09.11-1999.-O.No.1767.html (holding the Post Office Law’s limits on liability and damages to be unconstitutional limits on the right to sue the state); Case Nos. 82 and 83 of 2001, 59
MINSHŪ NO. 7 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 14, 2005) translation available at http://www.courts.
go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.09.14-2001.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..82%2C.2001.-Gyo-Hi.No..
76%2C.2001.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..83%2C.2001.-Gyo-Hi-.No..77.html (holding that it was
unconstitutional to prohibit voting by Japanese citizens assigned to work abroad in single
district election districts).
48. See ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 131–32 (1976). Writing about the Japanese criminal law system, Professor Daniel Foote notes:
[U]nder the influence of the Occupation following World War II, Japan
adopted an adversary system that, in structure, is very similar to that of the
United States. In practice, however, the adversary system operates in a much
less adversarial fashion in Japan than in the United States.
Daniel H. Foote, Reflections on Japan’s Cooperative Adversary Process, in THE
JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 29 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa
eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2002).
49. See MINSOHŌ, art. 202, para. 1 (providing that the party offering the witness directly examines the witnesses first, followed by examination by the opposition party, and
finally examination by the court); MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU, art. 114 (using the phrase
“cross-examination” and limiting cross-examination to credibility and matters brought
out in direct examination). But see MINSOHŌ, art. 205 (expressing a preference and accepting written witness statements in lieu of oral testimony); MINSOHŌ, art. 202, para. 2
(permitting the judge to modify the order of examination so that the court may question
the witness first). These provisions diminish the role of cross-examination. Indeed, there
are few, if any, oral witnesses in the typical Japanese civil case. In 2001, 85.5% of cases
had no witnesses testify, and in 2002, that percentage increased to 86.4%. See GOODMAN,
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 354.

2007]

CONTEXT, CULTURE, COMMUNITY

137

them in a different light.50 In addition, unlike in the United States where
it is common for lawyers to represent parties, parties in Japan at the firstlevel trial frequently appear pro se,51 inspiring judges to rise to their defense when the occasion demanded. As a consequence, the trial process
atrophied into a procedure that minimized lawyer participation and
maximized the role of the judge. Judges with a paternalistic attitude towards the parties and attorneys before them once again predominated
despite the Occupation era reform of the Old Code.52
The Occupation’s view of judicial reform resulted in the abolishment
of Japan’s Administrative Court in favor of a single judiciary without
special courts,53 the adoption of judicial review, and the grant of independence from the Ministry of Justice to the judiciary.54 As a consequence, the immediate post-war judicial system was composed mostly of
judges who had served pre-war. As the system was bureaucratic in nature
(the Occupation had taken the judicial bureaucracy out of the hands of
the Ministry of Justice and placed it in the hands of the Supreme Court),
the more senior judges in the system were those who had served the
longest pre-war and the judges appointed post-war tended to be junior to
those who had served in the pre-war period. On bench, these judges quite
naturally applied the legal thinking that had guided them through the
Hogakubu law faculties they had attended and the reasoning they applied
to cases before the war.55 That thinking was strongly influenced by custom, reason, and the notion of Japanese norms of behavior. Pre-war
judges tended to decide cases according to what was viewed as right or
50. See Kohji Tanabe assisted by John B. Hurlbut, The Process of Litigation: An Experiment With the Adversary System, in LAW IN JAPAN 73, 74 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren
ed., 1963); GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 184.
51. See Goodman, Japan, supra note 9, at 567.
52. This is especially true in a system like Japan’s, where the judge is not an impartial
referee, but rather is a representative of the state charged with ensuring that the correct
party wins. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at 87; Makoto Itoh, The Reception in Japan of the
American Law and its Transformation in the Fifty Years since the End of World War II:
Civil Procedure Law, 26 LAW IN JAPAN 66, 68–69 (2000).
53. Before World War II, Japan’s Administrative Court operated as a tribunal independent from the primary judiciary, as is common in civil law systems. However,
changes to the Japanese Constitution in 1946 provided that “no extraordinary tribunal
shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial
power.” KENPŌ, art. 76, para. 2.
54. See OPPLER, supra note 48, at 85–91; Takaaki Hattori assisted by Richard W.
Rabinowitz, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its Historical Development and Present
State, in LAW IN JAPAN 111, 121–24, 130 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963).
55. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at 90–94. For a discussion of the development of the
Japanese “legal mind” and the influence of senior judges on more junior judges, see JOHN
OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 121–22 (1998) [hereinafter HALEY, SPIRIT].
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appropriate in the circumstances, rather than based on the science of the
Code or other statutory principle.56
The ability of Japanese judges to create a body of judge-made law,
much as American judges can, is highlighted by lines of decisions like
those that establish the legal foundation for the lifetime employment system,57 the rights of tenants to remain in possession of leased property
even though the term of the lease has expired,58 and the rights of distributors not to be terminated unless procedures deemed fair under the circumstances are followed.59 And, like common law courts, Japanese

56. See Takayanagi, supra note 34, at 25–27. See also HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55,
at 205 (“In case after case throughout the century, Japanese judges have denied ‘rights’ in
order to ameliorate what they have perceived to be the injustice of property and contract
enabling those with greater economic or social leverage to enlist the aid of the state
against those with whom they dealt.”). Prewar judges also applied the Japanese concept
of jori (also written as dori). This application was based, at least in part, on Decree No.
103 of 1875, which provided that when no written law or custom applied to a case, the
judge should apply reason. See Takayanagi, supra note 34, at 25–26.
57. See Daniel Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism
in the Service of—Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635 (1996); Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of
Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 3, 44 (1996) (“Judge-made law supports the lifetime employment system by supplying bargaining endowments to both employers and employees,
enabling malleable, long-term employment patterns.”). For a critique of Foote’s explanation that the rule arose as a consequence of the judiciary’s action to protect a weaker
party (the employees) from the unilateral action of a stronger party (the employer) while
maintaining stability, see David Kettler & Charles T. Tackney, Light from a Dead Sun:
The Japanese Lifetime Employment System and Weimar Labor Law, 19 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 1 (1997). Kettler and Tackney, while agreeing with Foote’s basic theory that
lifetime employment is a product of judge-made law, believe that “[n]ot judicial traditionalism but a novel combination of labor activism and imported legal approaches led
Japanese courts to assimilate the employment relationship Foote emphasizes.” Id. at 4.
58. See Yukio Noguchi, Land Problems and Policies in Japan; Structural Aspects, in
LAND ISSUES IN JAPAN: A POLICY FAILURE? 26 (John O. Haley & Kozo Yamamura eds.,
Society for Japanese Studies 1992). See also Fukui, supra note 27, at 69 n.37 (“In the
realm of lease law in Japan, . . . the theory of trust relations has developed.”).
59. See WILLEM M. VISSER ‘T HOOFT, JAPANESE CONTRACT AND ANTI-TRUST LAW: A
SOCIOLOGICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY 46–47 (2002) (“Since no specific legal rules
govern the termination disputes between manufacturers and distributors, court decisions
have constituted the main source of law . . . . [I]n cases of termination, Japanese Courts
do sometimes not distinguish the differences between distribution agreements and other
continuing commercial contracts . . . .”). For a discussion of judicial law-making in the
area of landlord-tenant relations, see HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55, at 140–47. For a discussion of judicial law-making in the areas of labor and employment law, see TAKASHI
ARAKI, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN JAPAN 23 (Japan Institute of Labor 2002) (“The
most important characteristic of legal protection for employment security, restraint on
dismissals, is not imposed by legislation (statutes) but by case law or judicial precedent
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judges may modify court-established rules to meet new circumstances.60
In applying both the good faith and morals as well as the abuse of rights
provisions of the Civil Code,61 Japanese judges are not averse to the application of Japanese norms, even when a statute or the constitution itself
may point in a different direction. This kind of common law approach is
not a reflection of the influence of American legal thinking, but rather
reflects indigenous Japanese thinking on the proper role of the judiciary
in society. It reflects a subtle blend of civil law, common law, and customary law.
The function of the judge in rendering a “right” decision, meaning a
decision in which the party who should win does win, is based on German legal thinking. Although modern cases eschew such a hard and fast
rule, the reality is that the Japanese judge sees it as her function to make
the correct decision. What is correct depends very much on the circumstances at the time of decision as well as at the time of the act, social
norms, and the facts of the case.62
D. Post-War Movement to Broader Production Practice
The post-war circumstance of Japan was dire indeed. The war left a
ravaged country with little or no economic structure. To most, the first
order of the day was to rebuild the economy and, as a consequence,
many other values took second place to the creation of the economic
miracle.63 Courts were not immune to this need. It was not until the Mi-

. . . . [E]mployers’ freedom to dismiss is significantly curtailed by the established case
law requiring just cause.”) and Foote, supra note 57.
60. See VISSER ‘T HOOFT, supra note 59, at 187. Visser ‘T Hooft remarks:
[R]ecently in relation to termination disputes the Japanese courts have tended
to place more emphasis on the principles of classical contract law, such as the
freedom of contract. . . . Many factors such as the current poor economic climate and internationalisation may have reduced the reliance upon unwritten social codes and mutual trust.
Id.
61. See MINPŌ [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, arts. 1, 90, translated in EHS LAW
BULL. SER. no. 2100–2101 (2007).
62. See Fukui, supra note 27, at 70–75; Tanabe, supra note 50, at 87, 92–94. See also
HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55, at 156–76.
63. See Julian Gresser, Koichiro Fujikura, & Akio Morishima, The Crucible of Value
Transformation—Excerpts from Environmental Law in Japan, 7 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 61, 61 (1982) (“World War II left Japan economically, socially, and politically destitute. The transcendent concern of the Japanese in the early postwar period was economic
recovery . . . . It was assumed that industrial growth was an immutable ‘good’ to which
all else might be subordinated.”).
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namata disease and other major pollution cases,64 which marked a change
in Japan’s attitude toward environmental matters, that values other than
purely economic values were embraced. As a consequence, the power of
major corporations to affect the Civil Procedure Code and civil procedure in general diminished, enabling others to press for changes that
might help plaintiffs in litigation against corporations. Moreover, many
bengoshi, freed from the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, saw it as
their role to strenuously represent the interests of their clients and to perform a societal service by representing the weak against the strong.65
Many of these lawyers looked to the United States where the discovery
rules were perceived to favor individual plaintiffs in disputes with corporations by placing corporate documents and other information in the
hands of plaintiffs’ lawyers. Many Japanese judges also desired access to
some internal corporate documents so that a correct decision could be
rendered in the case.66
While the civil law system generally does not have a vibrant discovery
process, the system in Japan does recognize a need for parties to produce
evidence relevant to a case.67 As the judge (as inquisitor) is the player
who elicits the facts, the classic civil law system sees it as an abuse of the
system for parties or their representatives to discuss the case with poten64. For a discussion of the Big Four pollution cases, see FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN POST WAR JAPAN (Harvard Univ. Press 1987); Frank K. Upham, Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan: An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese
Pollution Suits, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (1976).
65. See Case No. 2126 of 2005, 61 MINSHŪ NO. 3 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 24, 2007) (Mutsuo
Tahara, J., concurring) translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/
judgments/text/2007.04.24-2005.-Ju-.No..2126.html; Toshiro Nishimura, Partner, Nishimura & Partners, Speech at the Temple University in Japan “Professional Ethics in International Business” Seminar: The Code of Ethics Applicable to Bengoshi (Dec. 1, 1998),
www.tuj.ac.jp/newsite/main/law/benethics.html. Similarly, as lawyers are seen as representing the public interest, including the interest to assure that the government does not
abuse rights, bengoshi are prohibited (with limited exceptions) from being employed full
time by government agencies. See Bengoshi hō [Lawyers Law of Japan], Law No. 205 of
1949, art. 30, translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2040 (2001) (“A lawyer shall not
concurrently assume any public post for which compensation is made.”).
66. In Japan, the judge determines what evidence is relevant and probative, while also
serving as the decision maker. The judge’s function is to see that the party who should
win does in fact win. See supra note 62 and citations therein. Prior to the enactment of
the New Code, many Japanese judges loosely interpreted the Old Code’s document production article to permit greater production so that parties could properly form either their
claim or defense. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 290.
67. For a discussion of some mechanisms to obtain information in Japan, see Koji
Harada, Discovery Under Japanese Law, 16 LAW IN JAPAN 21 (1983) and Craig P. Wagnild, Civil Law Discovery in Japan: A Comparison of Japanese and U.S. Methods of
Evidence Collection in Litigation, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2002).
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tial witnesses.68 Witnesses are to be examined by the judge without advance preparation by the lawyer or party.69 The pre-war Japanese system
(and this remains true in the post-war period as well) allowed lawyers to
send questions to prospective witnesses through the lawyer’s Bar Association, thus avoiding the charge that the lawyer was influencing the testimony.70 But there was, and still is, no mechanism requiring the Bar Association to forward the questions or compelling the witness to answer
them. The Americanization of Japan’s civil procedure system, which
elevated the questioning of witnesses by the lawyers to a central feature,
anticipated that, as in America, the lawyer in a case would interview witnesses before their testimony was given.71 Nonetheless, the Code of Civil
Procedure retains the pre-war procedure and many Japanese lawyers still
utilize the old system of forwarding questions through the Bar Associations rather than risk the appearance of influencing the witnesses’ responses.72 This approach, in turn, leads to ineffective direct examination
and leaves lawyers to rely on the court’s questioning of witnesses,73 even
if the Code places that responsibility on counsel.74
The civil law system in Japan has produced long, drawn-out, and contested cases, some of which last for many years before a judge is pre68. For the lawyer to interview a witness before the judge has examined the witness
would be considered an ethics breach, as the lawyer does not play a role in gathering
evidence in the civil law system—this is a judicial function. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at
75. The gathering of evidence is a “sovereign” function performed by the state’s representative, the judge. See Hazard, supra note 16, at 1019–20.
69. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at 96 (“Under the prewar Japanese system . . . pretrial
interview of witnesses was forbidden . . . .”).
70. See Bengoshi hō [Lawyers Law of Japan], Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 23, para. 3,
translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2040 (2001). Questions sent through the Bar Association may be sent prior to the filing of the Complaint. There is no requirement to
reply to questions sent through the Bar Association.
71. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at 81–83.
72. For a discussion of the Bar Association question process, see Craig P. Wignild,
Civil Law Discovery in Japan: A Comparison of Japanese and U.S. Methods of Evidence
Collection in Civil Litigation, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y JOURNAL 1, 10 (2002) and Harada, supra note 67, at 25–26.
73. See Itoh, supra note 52, at 68. See generally Tanabe, supra note 50.
74. See MINSOHŌ, art. 202; MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU [Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure], art. 113, para. 1–2, art. 114, translated in TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (Taniguchi-Reich-Miyake ed., Juris Publishing
2007) (1983) [hereinafter MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU]. Some critique the American approach
of placing responsibility for questioning in the hands of the lawyers, and argue that the
process was bound to fail because of the lack of discovery in Japan. See, e.g., Kojima,
supra note 12, at 706–07 (“Witnesses are to be examined reciprocally, that is by both
parties. . . . Partly because there was no discovery, reciprocal examination did not work
effectively.”).
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pared to render a decision. Of course, such long procedures make litigation an ineffective method of resolving disputes, yielding the varied conciliation and mediation methods of dispute resolution that are ubiquitous
in Japan.75 But a technologically industrialized Japan is bound to have
some litigation, and political pressures to conclude cases more quickly
have emerged. Responding to that pressure, the 1996 Code provided a
statutory base for a new “Preparation for Oral Argument” phase of a
case, wherein the formalities of a public trial could be avoided, enabling
a relatively quick settlement.76
The 1996 Code also looked to the American discovery model for tools
to accelerate the plenary proceeding phase of a litigated case. The
American interrogatory was seen as a vehicle to accomplish this goal
while also aiding both the court and the parties. As a consequence, a prefiling inquiry was adopted, under which a potential plaintiff could send
questions to his target defendant in an effort to cabin the issues for the
potential litigation.77 Once litigation was initiated, the same process
could be used post-filing to gather evidence.78 However, unlike American interrogatories, there is no compulsion on the part of the receiving
party to respond to inquiries, whether pre- or post-filing.79 Because the
process can be elected post-filing, most Japanese parties find it more
convenient and consistent with past practices to utilize the inquiry process, if at all, after the case has been filed.80 Then, if a party refuses to respond, the judge, who has power to compel a party to be forthcoming,
may be prevailed upon to request the same information.81 The result has
been that pre-filing inquiry is of virtually no use and post-filing inquiry

75. See supra note 26. See also GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 25, at 259–
63. For a discussion of various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms available in
Japan, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 199–204.
76. See MINSOHŌ, art. 168–74.
77. See MINSOHŌ, art. 132-2–132-8. See also Koichi Miki, Roles of Judges and Attorneys Under the Non-Sanction Scheme in Japanese Civil Procedure, 27 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 31, 37 (2003).
78. See MINSOHŌ, art. 163. For a discussion of the inquiry process both pre-filing and
post-filing, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19.
79. See MINSOHŌ, art. 163. See also Miki, supra note 77, at 38 (“A common feature
of the new devices described above is that they do not have any sanctions or coercive
power to compel enforcement.”); id. at 40 (“In short, there are no means to compel an
answer or guarantee a truthful answer.”).
80. See Goodman, Japan, supra note 9, at 572–73, 577–78.
81. See Miki, supra note 77, at 42 (“[J]udges are expected to be investigators under
the continental procedural system. Usually they do not hesitate to make inquiries of the
parties in order to clarify issues and to request the production of evidence that they deem
essential to the case.”).
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has not advanced the process much beyond the pre-1996 Code situation.82
E. Production of Documents—Changes with the New Code
Civil law judges have the ability to require a party to produce documents and other evidence that is essential to reach a fair decision.83 The
Old Code gave this authority to Japanese judges—but limited its use in
several important respects. It is in this area that the 1996 Code made several changes. This section reviews the limitations on this authority in the
Old Code and as a counterpoint, discusses the changes wrought in the
1996 Code.
First, the procedure contemplated in the Old Code was not (and still is
not) discovery. Unlike the American system where parties ask questions
of each other in order to discover the existence of relevant documents or
demand documents to ascertain relevance, the Old Code required that a
party know of the existence of a document before asking a judge to have
a party produce it.84 Thus, a party requesting a document through a judge
had to provide specific information concerning the document, including a
justification for production that meant, or at least implied, that the requesting party must know what the document said before asking for it.85
These procedural requirements of the Old Code inhibited production.
The 1996 Code retained the specificity requirements for document requests,86 but added provisions making it easier for a requesting party to
82. Bengoshi also use the Japanese procedure for preservation of evidence in their
attempt to discover documents. See MINSOHŌ, art. 234–42. If a court is convinced that
evidence must be preserved, it may order the evidence produced for preservation purposes. The preservation motion can be made before a suit is filed, so the mechanism may
operate like discovery. However, it is not designed for discovery purposes and the requesting party must make a compelling case for preservation—something that can be
achieved if a witness is likely to die soon or leave the country, or evidence is likely to be
destroyed in the immediate future unless preserved. In these cases, preservation has been
used (although rarely) to actually discover what a witness has to say or to otherwise disclose facts. Nonetheless, the process is discretionary with the court and the burden on the
party seeking preservation is high, even in the few situations where preservation may be
required. It has limited value as a discovery device. See GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note
19, at 258–61 (discussing preservation of evidence under the 1996 Code).
83. See MINSOHŌ, art. 219–23. See also Hazard, supra note 16, at 1028 (“The letter of
procedural law in the civil law regimes is that the judiciary is responsible for obtaining
evidence, a responsibility that could not be delegated. It is a responsibility that certainly
could not be delegated to partisan advocates for litigation parties.”).
84. See KYŪ-MINSOHŌ, art. 313.
85. See id. art. 313, paras. 1–5.
86. See MINSOHŌ, art. 221; MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU, art. 140 (regarding motions for
production orders).
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identify the desired documents when specifying the content of the document was not possible. As the theoretical basis for the requirement was
to make it possible for the producing party to know what document was
being sought, the 1996 Code merely required that the requestor furnish
sufficient information to allow the holder to identify the desired document.87 Then, the holder of the document would provide the necessary
specification.88
Second, under the Old Code, the obligation to produce a document was
coextensive with a witness’s requirement to testify; consequently, if a
document was privileged, it was not subject to production.89 The 1996
Code modified this requirement by allowing the judge to review privileged documents in camera and to order production of the requested materials in redacted form.90
Third, production was limited to narrow circumstances in the Old
Code. Thus, the Old Code allowed a judge to order production in only
three situations:
(i)

where the party possessing the document was relying on the document in the case, but had not yet
produced the document;91

(ii)

where the requesting party had a right to the document under some substantive law;92 or

(iii)

where the document had been created as a consequence of a relationship between the parties (a “relationship document”) or was created for the benefit
of the requesting party (a “benefit document”).93

Some Japanese judges, urged on by plaintiffs’ lawyers, broadly interpreted the third requirement to avoid the restricted nature of these categories. Thus, what was considered a relationship document or a benefit
87. See MINSOHŌ, art. 222, para. 1.
88. See id. art. 222, para. 2.
89. See KYŪ-MINSOHŌ, arts. 280–81; Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 294 (explaining
coextensive witness testimony and document production obligations under the Old
Code).
90. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, para. 1, 223, para. 3; MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU, art. 141.
Where the holder of the document is a non-party, the court may question the holder before ordering production and/or redaction. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, para. 2.
91. See KYŪ-MINSOHŌ, art. 312, para. 1.
92. See id. art. 312, para. 2.
93. See id. art. 312, para. 3.
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document was given a broad interpretation by some lower court judges.
Other judges saw this expansive reading of the Old Code as inconsistent
with the real meaning of the limitations. To cabin the expansive reading
of the Old Code, these judges adopted a rule under which a document
prepared solely for the use of the possessor of the document (i.e., a selfuse document) could not also be considered a relationship document or a
benefit document.94
Fourth, there was no provision in the Old Code allowing the judge to
order the government to produce documents. Thus, documents in the
possession of a government agency were unavailable in private litigation.
Reformers of the Old Code could not avoid dealing with these four
limitations. On one hand, plaintiffs’ lawyers wanted a major rewriting of
the production rules to allow for production beyond that allowed by the
Old Code.95 On the other hand, lawyers who represented corporate interests (typical defendants) were quite happy with the status quo.96 The
government, for its part, was hesitant about having to produce documents, especially when it thought the national interest (or at least the
government’s interest) could be harmed by production. The 1996 Code
sought a compromise. This compromise took final form in article 220.97
The 1996 amendments resolved the government’s complaint by postponing to a later date the terms under which the government could be
ordered to produce documents. To satisfy those demanding a provision
requiring that the government could be compelled to produce, the 1996
Code made clear that an amendment to that end would be forthcoming (a
two-year period was provided).98 In due course, an amendment was en94. For a discussion of lower courts’ efforts to expand production and the corresponding effort of other courts to limit it through the judicial creation of the self-use exception,
see Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 290–93; Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 776–78; Harada,
supra note 67, at 43–48; Kojima, supra note 12, at 702–03. See also KUO-CHANG
HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 176–89 (2003).
95. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 296 (explaining that the Old Code’s document
production provisions gave insufficient access to individual plaintiffs bringing suits
against corporations and the government).
96. See id. at 299 (explaining that corporations favored a plan narrower than the New
Code); Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 776–78.
97. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220.
98. As adopted, the 1996 Code provided that an investigation would be undertaken
and an amendment to deal with the issue of documents in the government’s possession
would be submitted within approximately two years of June 26, 1996, the date on which
the 1996 Code was promulgated.
[A] compromise was worked out between the Government and the Diet, in
which the bill was amended as follows: (4)(b) was dropped (Art.220(4)) and a
provision was added to the chapter of transitory provisions to the effect that the
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acted that authorized a court to direct the government to produce documents, except where it would hinder performance of the public duty,
harm the public interest, or disclose a government secret.99 In addition,
production should be denied if it would be likely to harm national security, damage the relationship between Japan and a foreign country or international organization, or prejudice the government in negotiations
with a foreign power or international organization.100 Once a party makes
a motion to have the government produce a document, the court, unless it
finds the reasons for production given by the requestor clearly unreasonable, must confer with the appropriate government official concerning
the request.101 The government is then given an opportunity to present its
opinions as to why production is exempted under the law.102
Article 220 took account of the arguments made by defendants’ lawyers by retaining the three limited categories pursuant to which documents could be produced.103 In this sense, it left the Old Code unchanged. But to account for the desires of plaintiffs’ lawyers, the 1996
Code contained a catch-all provision allowing production of virtually any
document.104 To contain this open-ended production category, the 1996
Code limited the production of any other document by providing that
certain categories of such documents not be produced.105 Among these
categories was the self-use document106 (i.e., a document prepared solely
for the use of the party in possession of the document), thereby meeting

Government must further consider the matter to come up with an appropriate
conclusion within two years in keeping consistency with the system of the public access to the government documents currently in deliberation.
Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 777.
99. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(b).
100. See id. art. 223, para. 4(1).
101. See id. art. 223.
102. See id. art. 220, para. 4(b), art. 223.
103. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, paras. 1–3.
104. See id. art. 220, para. 4.
105. See id. art. 220, paras. 4(a)–4(c). Professor Mochizuki describes the compromise
as follows:
Article 220[] begins with a restatement into modern written Japanese of the
three clauses of Article 312 of the Old Code. Clause 4, however, states that
people must also produce documents that are not covered by the first three
clauses, so long as one of four exceptions does not apply.
See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 299.
106. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(c).
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the desire of defendants’ counsel that the self-use exception be made a
part of the 1996 Code.107
Scholarly opinion as to the effect of these code changes varied, although there was general consensus that the changes would lead to a shift
in judicial approach as to the presumption of production, and consequently, a narrowing of the scope of the judicially created self-use doctrine. Nonetheless, the Justice Ministry handbook on the 1996 amendments took a position that is similar to the test for self-use documents
under the Old Code:
[W]hether a document is a Clause 4 self-use document will turn on
whether it “was created solely for internal use and is not expected to be
shown to unrelated outsiders, considering the totality of circumstances
such as the content of the document, and the process by and reason for
which the document was created and is now possessed by its current
possessor.”108

An intriguing question was the effect the structure of the 1996 Code
production provision would have on the meaning of a benefit document
or a relationship document. From a purely grammatical point of view, the
categories that had given rise to the self-use exception were not included
in the language limiting production on the basis of self-use status. Yet it
could be argued that the language of the 1996 Code was meant to place
relationship and benefit documents back into the narrow category they
had occupied before some courts broadly interpreted them as producible.109 Such broad—some would say strained—interpretation was no
longer necessary, as any document could be ordered for production.110
107. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 302 (“[O]pponents of generalizing the duty to
produce wanted documents covered by the old self-use exception to be similarly protected under the new law . . . .”).
108. Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 302 (quoting ICHIMON ITTO SHIN MINJI SOSHO HO
[QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 252 (Counsellor’s
Office, Civil Affairs Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Justice ed., 1996)). See also Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 778.
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
110. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 299–301 (“Uncertainty about the breadth of the
self use exceptions raises questions about the New Code’s commitment to greater access
to information.”). In addition to the exceptions to production mentioned above, the Code
also applies the various privileges that apply to oral testimony to documents. See
MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(b). Privileges in Japan are somewhat broader than the privileges in the United States, and include privileges for pharmacists, midwives, and foreign
lawyers licensed to give foreign legal advice in Japan, as well as a privilege for trade and
professional secrets. See MINSOHŌ, art. 197. In addition, although not designated a “privilege,” a witness may not be asked questions that embarrass the witness. MINJI SOSH-O
KISOHU, art. 115. How broadly a judge will interpret embarrassment remains to be seen
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In sum, by attempting to meet the objections and requirements of all
parties, the language of article 220 of the 1996 Code set the stage for judicial interpretation of the meaning of the document production requirement, especially the statutory self-use exception.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT’S
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
A. The First Judicial Interpretation of Self-Use: Fuji Bank v. Maeda
Litigation concerning the meaning of the document production provisions followed on the heels of the 1996 Code, which took effect in 1998.
The Supreme Court rendered its first decision dealing with the meaning
of the 1996 Code’s document production provisions in November 1999
with Fuji Bank.111 The plaintiff was the family of a debtor who had killed
himself when he was unable to repay loans he spent speculating in the
stock market.112 The defendant was the banking institution that had lent
him the money.113 The document sought was an internal bank document
prepared because the loan amount exceeded the branch bank’s lending
authority.114
The debtor’s family argued that the lending bank owed a duty to the
borrower when the bank was aware or should have been aware that the
borrower had no assets to repay the loan and thus, the bank should have
refused to extend the loan.115 The family sought damages for breach of
this duty, arguing that it was the proximate cause of the suicide.116 To
establish its case, the family asked the court to order the bank to produce
the internal bank documents used to determine whether a loan should be
granted.117 Such internal documents were required by the bank’s home
office because the size of the loan exceeded the local branch manager’s
lending authority.118 The plaintiff argued that the documents would disbut it is not unreasonable to conclude that questions to an executive of a company that
would elicit responses embarrassing to the company would run afoul of article 115.
111. See Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2
.html.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2
.html.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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close that bank officials were aware of the decedent’s precarious financial position and that some of them had urged that they reject the application because the decedent would be unable to repay,119 which would establish that the bank was aware of the risks to the decedent and accordingly owed a duty to the decedent not to extend credit.120
The document was the bank’s internal document containing the advice
and opinions of bank executives that was relevant to the case. The issue
before the court was whether the document was a self-use document exempt from production under the 1996 Code. The Tokyo High Court held
that the document was not a self-use document and ordered its production.121 On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held
that the document was exempt from production.122
The Supreme Court reasoned that: (i) the document was prepared for
the internal use; (ii) the bank did not intend to allow others outside the
company to ever view the document; and (iii) the bank would suffer
harm if the document was produced because in future situations persons
within the company would be afraid to present their views in an open and
forthright matter out of concern that their opinions would later be subjected to public scrutiny.123 What appears to have been of greatest concern to the Court was that production might inhibit the free flow of information and views within the company, causing damage to the decision-making process.124 Accordingly, the Court held that the document
was a self-use document, and in the absence of some special circumstance, was not subject to production.125 Since no special circumstance
was shown, the High Court’s production order was reversed.126
Several things about the decision are of importance. First, although
there are some differences regarding the proper translation of the self-use
exception in the 1996 Code, the translations make it clear that to be a
self-use document, the document must have been intended only for the
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2
.html.
122. Id. Under article 223, paragraph 7 of the 1996 Code, a ruling granting or denying
a motion for production is subject to immediate interlocutory appeal, known as a kokoku
appeal. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, para. 7.
123. Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2
.html.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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use of the holder of the document (and it seems reasonably clear that
such a holder would have been the preparer of the document—thus it was
prepared solely for the use of the preparer-holder).127 The statutory language contains no other requirements for a document to be an excluded
self-use document.128 Yet the Supreme Court in Fuji Bank makes it clear
that a self-use document is not shielded from production merely because
it was prepared for the exclusive use of the preparer-holder of the document.129 In addition to meeting the statutory definition of a self-use
document, the document will only be exempted from disclosure if disclosure “is likely to cause disadvantage” to the preparer-holder.130
Second, the Supreme Court’s opinion takes the position that even if a
document is a self-use document whose production will cause disadvantage to the holder, the Court may nonetheless order its production if there
are “special circumstances.”131 The 1996 Code does not reference or define “special circumstances,” and the Court in Fuji Bank likewise failed
to define “special circumstances,” even when it introduced the concept.132
Having decided that the document fell within the self-use exception,
the Supreme Court also noted that it was clear that the document was not
producible under the provision of the 1996 Code governing relationship
documents, article 220, paragraph 3.133 The Court did not explain why a
self-use document could not also be a relationship document, although
the opinion implied that a self-use document, by definition, could not be
127. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
35.html (“[a]ny document for the exclusive use of the holder of the document”); Case
No. 14 of 2004, 58 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2004), translation available
at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.11.26-2004-Kyo-No..14.html (“a
document that is intended exclusively for the use by the holder thereof”); Case No. 39 of
2005, 60 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 2006), translation available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.02.17-2005.-Kyo-.No..39.html (“[a]
document provided exclusively for use by the holder . . .”); Case No. 15 of 2001, 55
MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001), translation available at http://www.courts.
go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001-Kyo-No.15.html (“is exclusively offered
for use by the holder thereof”).
128. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4.
129. See Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.
2.html.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. However, on the facts in Fuji Bank, the Court found that special circumstances
did not exist and thus refused to order production. Id.
133. Id.
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a relationship document.134 As the grammatical structure of article 220
appears to limit the self-use exception to the catch-all category of documents, this implication may be important.135 It would appear that the selfuse exception would, in fact, also apply to relationship documents
through an indirect mechanism; that is, by limiting the definition of relationship documents so that a document must fail the self-use exception as
a necessary condition for relationship status.
B. The Aftermath of Fuji Bank
Four months after the Fuji Bank decision was issued, the Court had another opportunity to discuss document production.136 The plaintiff in this
case was a purchaser of telephone communications equipment who
sought damages after the equipment failed to operate properly, making
communication through use of the equipment impossible.137 To establish
its case that the equipment was defective, the plaintiff sought production
of schematic drawings of the equipment, relying on the catch-all provision of article 220.138 The defendant objected to production on two
grounds. First, article 220, paragraph 4(b), by incorporating the testimonial privilege applicable to trade and professional secrets, exempts from
the catch-all category documents that record professional or technical
secrets.139 Second, the defendant claimed that the schematic was created
solely for the internal use of the company, i.e., it was a self-use document.140 The Osaka High Court refused to order production.141 The Su-

134. Id.
135. The catch-all provision is article 220, paragraph 4. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4.
136. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No.
20.html. Japanese cases are not cited by the names of the parties, but are referred to by
case number and date. This practice preserves the privacy of the litigants. However, it is
possible to determine the names of parties in some cases, and for convenience these cases
(e.g., Fuji Bank) may be referred to as such. Additionally, since Japanese High Court
cases are not binding, the court’s opinions may not be published and are not cited by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court fully explains the High Court holding and reasoning
in many cases, so citations in this Article to the High Court reasoning refer to the Supreme Court opinion.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No.
20.html.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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preme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine
whether the documents were exempt from production. 142
As an initial matter, the Court found that merely because the document
related to a product that defendant manufactured and contained information concerning the product, it was not ipso facto a trade secret document.143 To make a document a trade or professional secret document,
the possessor needs to establish that production of the document would
disadvantage her in some fashion.144 The risk that competitors might see
the document does not itself amount to disadvantage.145 In short, to be a
professional or trade secret document, disclosure must somehow disadvantage the profession or otherwise adversely affect the party trying to
keep the document secret.146 The matter was remanded for the High
Court to consider whether the document in fact contained secrets within
the Fuji Bank definition.147
In dealing with the defendant’s second claim, the Court reaffirmed its
statement in Fuji Bank that to be a self-use document, the possessor must
show that: (i) the document had been prepared solely for the use of the
possessor; (ii) the document was never intended for disclosure to others;
and (iii) production would cause disadvantage to the possessor.148 In Fuji
Bank, the defendant bank was able to show that it would be injured by
production.149 However, in the instant case, no such showing had been
made.150 The High Court was satisfied that it was a self-use document
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No.
20.html.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Supreme Court observed that:
[A]lthough the Documents may contain technical information which the manufacturer of the equipment has, the opposite party has not presented the nature of
the information or the specific content of the disadvantage which may result
from the disclosure, and the decision of the original instance court has not
specified this.
Id.
148. Id. (citing and using the same language that it had used in Fuji Bank).
149. See Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.
2.html.
150. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No.
20.html.
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simply because the document was made for the sole use of the company.151 The High Court failed to consider whether any disadvantage
would result to the holder of the document if the document was produced.152 Without a finding of such injury, the document could not automatically be considered outside the catch-all category on the ground that
it was a self-use document.153 The matter was remanded for further proceedings.154
In December 2000, the Court had another chance to refine its Fuji
Bank holding.155 In this case, the Supreme Court reversed a ruling by the
High Court of Tokyo that ordered a defendant credit union to produce a
document regarding a loan in a stockholder’s derivative suit.156 The
stockholder argued that the directors had made certain loans with inadequate security, and hence, had breached their duty to the corporation.157
The stockholder requested internal documents of the credit union relating
to the making of the loans, claiming that the documents would disclose
the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.158 The credit union opposed production, arguing that the documents had been prepared solely for the use of
the credit union, and thus were self-use documents not subject to production.159
The Tokyo High Court reasoned that although the documents may not
have been created with an intent to distribute them outside the credit union, since the documents contained information concerning loans and the
actions of the directors thereto, the company should have known that, in
the event of a derivative lawsuit, the document could be produced as evidence.160 The High Court seemed particularly concerned with the availability of company documents to shareholders in a derivative suit—after
all, the shareholders own the company and a derivative action is brought

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
35.html.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
35.html.
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against directors for the benefit of the corporation, which is the holder of
the document.161
Upon review of the Tokyo High Court’s ruling, the Supreme Court majority held that “special circumstances” justifying production were not
met merely because the documents were sought in a derivative suit.162 To
qualify as a “special circumstance” within the meaning of Fuji Bank, the
requestor of the credit union documents would have to show that it was
“in a position identifiable with that of a credit association or the holder of
the document.”163 Although stockholders may have a right to inspect certain documents pursuant to substantive law that gives them access to
such documents (e.g., articles of incorporation, minutes of directors’
meetings, certain financial statements, etc.), the substantive law also limits the documents a stockholder is entitled to obtain.164 In addition, while
stockholders bringing a derivative suit may be in a position identifiable
with that of the credit union by virtue of the fact that any recovery flows
to the credit union, because the statutes limit the documents available to
stockholders (and there is no statutory exception for stockholderplaintiffs in a derivative case), stockholders are not in a position identifiable with that of the credit union itself.165 Hence, no “special circumstance” existed.166 A stockholder who brings a derivative suit is no more
entitled to internal decision-making documents (that are not made available by substantive law) than is any other litigant.167 While the action
was instituted on behalf of the corporation, a derivative plaintiff is not
161. See id. On shareholder derivative suits in Japan, see Tsuyoshi Yamada, Summary
Translation: The Daiwa Bank Case (1999), 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 193, 193 (2002) (“The
following is a summary translation of a representative action brought by Daiwa Bank's
stockholders against the Bank regarding the New York Daiwa Bank scandal. . . . This
case . . . fostered much debate about the derivative action system in Japan.”). See also
Mitsuru Misawa, Daiwa Bank Scandal in New York: Its Causes, Significance, and Lessons in the International Society, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1023 (1996).
162. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
35.html.
163. Id.
164. Shinyō kinko hō [Credit Association Law] Law No. 238 of 1951, art. 36, para. 4,
art. 37, para. 3, translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 6250 (1988). The Supreme Court
recognized these substantive rights in its decision. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ
2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/
english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..35.html.
165. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
35.html.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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the corporation and is not entitled to documents created solely for the
benefit of the corporation.168 As an aside, the Court again noted that the
self-use document cannot be considered a relationship document.169
Justice Machida Akira (who became Chief Justice in 2002) dissented.170 In his view, while the documents sought were self-use documents, the fact that they were sought in a derivative suit and contained
relevant information regarding whether there had been a breach of trust,
created the special circumstances required to override the self-use exception.171 The documents’ role in assuring consensus decision-making
within the company gave them a fundamental role in assuring that the
decision-making process complied with the duty of trust the directors
owed to the corporation.172 Accordingly, he believed the documents
should be produced in a derivative suit.173
In another derivative suit decided on the same day, the Court based its
decision on a matter of standing, not on the merits of the case.174 The
Court upheld a decision of the Tokyo High Court, which had ordered a
credit union to produce documents in a derivative suit against directors.175 The directors appealed the production order, but the credit union
did not.176 The Supreme Court held that only the possessor of docu168. Id.
169. The decision may reflect a judicial bias against derivative lawsuits. Such suits
were generally disfavored, and until recently, few derivative suits were brought because
the plaintiff received little, if any, financial gain, so that the filing fee alone made the
lawsuit cost prohibitive. Lower court decisions and pressure from the United States
caused the cost to be decreased to 8,200 yen, lowering the bar to derivative suits. See
Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United
States, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1436, 1463–65 (1994). The lower filing fee opened the door to
more derivative litigation but also raised concerns that such suits would be utilized by
Sokaiya Racketeers to extort money from corporations. See Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence From Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 374–75 (2001).
170. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000) (Akira, J.,
dissenting), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/
text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..35.html.
171. Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
35.html.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Case No. 36 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2743 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
36.html.
175. Id.
176. Id. The corporation on whose behalf a derivative suit is brought may intervene to
support its directors. See Case No. 17 of 2000, 55 MINSHŪ 30 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 30, 2001)
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.01.30-
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ments—here, the credit union—had standing to appeal an order requiring
production, and only a party seeking production could appeal an order
refusing production.177 As the directors did not fit either category, they
lacked standing to appeal the order to produce.178
A year later, in December 2001, the Supreme Court again contemplated whether a credit union’s internal document was subject to production.179 In this litigation, the debtor-plaintiff claimed that the credit union
was at fault in its dealings with him, and as a consequence, there should
be no liability under the debt.180 What distinguishes this decision from
the previous cases was that the original creator of the document was neither possessor of the document nor a party in the case. Rather, the credit
union had failed and all of its assets had been sold to a company that had
the job of liquidating assets of failed credit unions for the benefit of the
Japanese Government’s equivalent of the United States Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.181
This successor corporation filed suit to recover on the debt, and the
debtors set up a defense of unlawful conduct by the original lender.182 To
prove their contention, the debtors asked for documents that they claimed
would show improper conduct in connection with the loan by the original
lender.183 The successor corporation, which was in possession of the
documents, argued that the documents were similar to the documents in
the Fuji Bank case because they contained the opinions of firm employees and had been prepared solely for use inside the firm.184 Thus, they

2000.-Kyo-.No.17.html. Why the credit union did not object and file an appeal is not
stated in the Supreme Court opinion.
177. See Case No. 36 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2743 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
36.html.
178. See 54 MINSHŪ 2743 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000) (“[B]ecause the kokoku appellant
is not the holder ordered to produce the document but merely a party concerned in a case
as to the merits, not having the standing to lodge complaint against the original decision,
this kokoku appeal should inevitably be dismissed as unlawful.”).
179. See Case No. 15 of 2001, 55 MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001-Kyo-No.
15.html.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Case No. 15 of 2001, 55 MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001-Kyo-No.
15.html.
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were self-use documents not subject to production.185 The Osaka High
Court, however, ordered the defendant to produce the documents.186
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s production order and
dismissed the appeal.187 The Court reasoned that the original lender,
which had created the documents sought in the action, was no longer in
the lending business and was in the process of liquidation.188 Accordingly, it was no longer going to make any loans.189 Further, the possessor
of the documents, the successor company, might make loans in the future, but its opinions and the opinions of its employees would not be adversely affected by the production of documents created by the original
lender.190 Unlike Fuji Bank, production would not inhibit communication
and decision making inside the possessor company. Accordingly, the
Court found that special circumstances existed that warranted the production of these documents.191 The Court made no reference to the question of employee privacy.192
In a similar case, when an insurance company failed and the responsible government authority directed the administrators to appoint a special
independent committee to report on the role of former directors in the
company’s failure, the resulting report was not considered a self-use
document.193 In the main suit, which was between insurance companies,
the defendant, a failed company, was charged with obtaining funds from
the plaintiff based on fraudulent financial statements.194 To establish its
case, the plaintiff sought production of a copy of the investigative committee’s report.195 The report concluded that there was reason to believe
that there had been wrongdoing on the part of past management and recommended suit against former directors.196 The company administrator
possessing the report objected to production, claiming that the report was
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Case No. 15 of 2001, 55 MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001-Kyo-No.
15.html.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. See infra Part III for a discussion of the privacy issue.
193. See Case No. 14 of 2004, 58 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2004), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.11.26-2004-Kyo-No..
14.html.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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a self-use document.197 The company administrator also argued that because opinions of lawyers on the committee were set out in the report, it
was exempt from production because of attorney-client privilege.198 Both
the Tokyo High Court and the Supreme Court rejected these arguments
and ordered production.199
It was the view of the Court that the report, prepared for the failed
company’s administrators at the demand of the government agency supervising insurance companies, was not in the nature of a companyprepared document.200 Moreover, the administrators had been appointed
by the same governmental body in order to protect policy holders.201 The
report was prepared for the same public interest purpose, and thus was
not prepared solely for the benefit of the failed company or its administrators.202 The Court also concluded that although lawyers were members
of the committee, they had not been engaged to provide legal advice or
services, so no attorney-client privilege was involved.203
Up through 2004, although the Supreme Court did not define “special
and unusual circumstances,” it found them to exist where there was a
lack of standing to complain about production, where the creator of the
document was no longer in business, and where the document was created for a public interest purpose. Still, the thrust of the Fuji Bank case,
as reaffirmed by the Court’s refusal to order production in a derivative
suit, led the Japanese bar and lower court judges to conclude that little
had changed as a consequence of the 1996 amendment.204
C. Movement Away from the Strict Application of the Fuji Bank Holding
The prospect of change emerged in 2005. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has clarified the requirements of the self-use exception to
production and has more clearly defined when special circumstances exist that require document production. Although the most recent cases
have relaxed the production rules, the basic reasoning of Fuji Bank ap197. Id.
198. Case No. 14 of 2004, 58 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2004), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.11.26-2004-Kyo-No..
14.html.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Case No. 14 of 2004, 58 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2004), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.11.26-2004-Kyo-No..
14.html.
204. See Goodman, Japan, supra note 9, at 581, 584 n.282; Haley, Heisei Renewal,
supra note 8, at 7.
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pears to remain intact: documents of an ongoing business entity will be
considered self-use documents exempt from production if the documents
are prepared for decision-making purposes solely for examination within
the entity, and production might interfere with the free flow of information. That said, while the party seeking the exception bears the burden of
showing that production will cause injury, the party requesting production still faces a difficult task when seeking what American lawyers
would call a smoking-gun document—a document disclosing wrongdoing on the part of the possessor entity.
In July 2005, the Supreme Court upheld a debtor’s claim for money
damages based on an emotional injury suffered when a lender refused to
make available financial records concerning the loans between them.205
The debtor needed the records to work out an arrangement with his creditors.206 In this case, the possessor of the document was a lender licensed
to do business under the Money Lending Business Law (“MLBL”).207
The borrower had engaged in a series of transactions with the lender over
a period of time and had made numerous payments in connection with
the loans.208 Under the substantive law, the maximum rate of interest
payable on the loans was fixed. 209 The debtor was unable to continue
payments on the loans and engaged counsel to consolidate and make an
arrangement for the payment of his debts.210 Counsel, in turn, asked the
lender to produce the records of the various loans and payments made in
connection therewith, in an attempt to show that the rate of interest
charged to the debtor exceeded the maximum rate allowed by the law.211
The lender, while willing to discuss an arrangement for future repayment, was unwilling to produce the books.212 The debtor’s representatives were unwilling to discuss an arrangement until the records of prior
transactions had been produced.213 The debtor filed suit alleging that the
205. See Case No. 965 of 2004, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 19, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.19-2004.-Ju-.No..
965.html.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. Id. See also Risoku seigen hō [Interest Rate Restriction Law], Law No.100 of
1954, art. 1, translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2121 (1999) (providing for maximum
interest rates).
210. See Case No. 965 of 2004, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 19, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.19-2004.-Ju-.No..
965.html.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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interest rate charged exceeded the rate permitted by law, and that the
lender’s refusal to produce the records prior to the suit had caused the
debtor injury by impeding him from arranging for the payment of his
debts.214 Damages were sought for the emotional harm this allegedly
caused the debtor. In the litigation, the lender produced the records.215
With respect to the plaintiff’s first claim, the High Court found that
there had been overpayments and ordered the lender to make restitution
for overpayment of interest.216 With respect to plaintiff’s second claim,
alleging emotional injury, the High Court found that such relief was only
available if it could be said that there had been a breach of good faith by
the lender that had caused the non-pecuniary injury to the debtor.217 The
High Court found that there was no obligation for the lender to produce
the records.218 As the debtor and his representatives had not disclosed
that failure to make production was delaying the arrangement for payment of creditors and was having an adverse emotional effect, there was
no basis for the debtor’s claim that the lender’s conduct was such a gross
violation of the duty of good faith.219 Critical to the High Court’s reasoning was that there was no statutory duty on the part of the lender to produce the record of prior transactions.220
The plaintiff appealed this finding as to the second claim, and the Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s reasoning.221 The Supreme Court
found that, under the MLBL, the lender was required to keep records of
loans, repayments, and interest paid, and to provide copies to the debtor
when payments were made.222 The Court found that it was unreasonable
to believe that even sophisticated debtors would not at some point lose or
otherwise not have copies of some of these records.223 The Court also
concluded that the purpose of requiring the lender to keep records was, at
least in part, to have records available to resolve disputes that might arise

214. Id.
215. Case No. 965 of 2004, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 19, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.19-2004.-Ju-.No..
965.html.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Case No. 965 of 2004, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 19, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.19-2004.-Ju-.No..
965.html.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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between the lender and debtor.224 The Court noted that this conclusion
was supported by the Financial Services Agency guidelines, which require lenders make details of debt available to debtors.225
Thus, the Court concluded that the lender was required to produce records requested by a debtor attempting to work out an arrangement with
creditors.226 Moreover, the Court reasoned that no great burden would be
placed on the lender if it were required to produce the records from its
books, whereas great disadvantage would result to the borrower if denied
access to such records.227 The Court viewed this obligation as part of the
lender’s duty of good faith under the loan agreement, and unless there
was an abuse of right by the debtor, production was required.228 Since the
lender had unlawfully refused the debtor’s request over a period of six
months, the debtor had a right to recover non-pecuniary relief.229 The
case was remanded to the Osaka High Court for a determination of the
damages to be awarded.230
Although the above case did not directly involve an issue under article
220 of the 1996 Code, its holding is nonetheless relevant. The 1996 Code
requires, as did its predecessor, that a party to litigation produce any
document to which the requesting party has a right under substantive
law.231 In determining that a debtor could base a claim for non-pecuniary
relief on the failure of a lender doing business under the MLBL to make
available copies of records to a debtor, the Court also established a
debtor’s right in similar litigation to request production of the records
under the 1996 Code. As the MLBL did not specifically state that such
records were to be made available to debtors—the Court reached this
conclusion based on agency guidelines, the purpose of the law, and the
relative harms caused by production and non-production—this case may
be viewed as broadening the scope of production under the 1996 Code.232
224. Id.
225. See Case No. 965 of 2004, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 19, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.19-2004.-Ju-.No..
965.html.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Case No. 965 of 2004, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 19, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.19-2004.-Ju-.No..
965.html.
231. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 2.
232. It may be that this case is limited to its facts. Many lenders’ practices are under
scrutiny in Japan, and the Court may have been reacting to a general feeling that there is
something very wrong in some segments of the lending community. Guidance by a gov-

162

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 33:1

Three days after the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court decided
the above case and held that borrowers were entitled to production of the
records of their loan from a licensed lender, the Second Petty Bench decided a case which dealt with documents from a police investigation.233
Here, the Tokyo High Court held that the documents that formed the basis for a search warrant constituted documents regarding the legal relationship between the subject of the warrant and the police, and hence
were documents that could be ordered produced by the police under the
document production section of the 1996 Code, absent other legal provisions limiting production.234 Although the Supreme Court found that
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure inhibited production, and
thus refused to order production of most of the materials sought,235 in an
expansive reading of the 1996 Code, the Court reasoned that the underlying documents upon which the search was authorized were relationship
documents.236
The production issue in this case arose in a lawsuit brought by the subjects of a series of searches made in connection with an arson attack on
the home of a Prefectural Assembly Member.237 The plaintiffs sought
production of the warrant allowing the search, as well as numerous underlying documents. The subjects of the search were not arrested for the
crime—indeed, no arrests had been made—and argued that the government was responsible for damages in connection with the search and seiernment agency in Japan has significantly more compulsion than guidance from an
agency in the United States. Although parties in Japan are not required to follow guidance, most administrative guidance is in fact followed. For a discussion of administrative
guidance, see Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923
(1984), Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the “Developmental State”?: Administrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 593–94 (2001), and Meryll
Dean, Administrative Guidance in Japanese Law: A Threat to the Rule of Law, 1991 J.
BUS. L. 398.
233. See Case No. 4 (Kyo) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005),
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.222005.-Kyo-.No..4.html.
234. Id.
235. The warrants for conducting the search were subject to production, but under
article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure these documents must be shown to the
subject of the search and contained none of the information that was critical to plaintiff’s
case against the police. See KEISOHŌ [Code of Criminal Procedure], Law No. 131 of
1948, art.110, translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2600 (2005).
236. See Case No. 4 (Kyo) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005),
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.222005.-Kyo-.No..4.html.
237. Id.
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zure under the provisions of Japan’s Constitution that render the state
responsible for unlawful acts of its agents.238
The criminal investigation into the arson was ongoing at the time of the
Supreme Court’s decision. The Tokyo High Court ordered all of the requested documents be produced. Although the Supreme Court concurred
that the materials involved were relationship documents, it refused to
order production of most materials because of the ongoing investigation.239
The Supreme Court found that the search and seizure constituted a legal relationship between the police and the subject of the search.240 This
followed from the constitutional provisions requiring a warrant for a
search and making citizens and their effects secure in their homes.241
This constitutionally protected security could only be breached pursuant
to a warrant.242 Thus, the warrant and its execution created a legal relationship between the police and the subject of the search.243 The papers
allowing this legal relationship to be created, i.e., the warrant and the
underlying documents on which the issuance of the warrant were based,
were documents concerning the legal relations between the holder of the
document (the police or prosecutor) and the requesting party (the subject
of the search).244

238. See KENPŌ, art. 17 (“Every person may sue for redress as provided by law from
the State or a public entity, in case he has suffered damage through illegal act of any public official.”). The Law Concerning State Liability for Compensation carries out this constitutional provision and provides a cause of action to those injured by illegal acts of the
government or its agents. Kokka baishō hō [Law Concerning State Liability for Compensation], Law No. 125 of 1947, art. 1, translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 1015 (1993).
239. See Case No. 4 (Kyo) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.22-2005.Kyo-.No..4.html. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “[d]ocuments relating to
litigation shall not be made public prior to the opening of a public trial.” KEISOHŌ [Code
of Criminal Procedure], Law No. 131 of 1948, art. 47, translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER.
no. 2600 (2005).
240. See Case No. 4 (Kyo) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005),
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.222005.-Kyo-.No..4.html.
241. See KENPŌ, art. 35 (“The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers
and effects against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for adequate cause. . . .”).
242. See Case No. 4 (Kyo) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005),
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.222005.-Kyo-.No..4.html.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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Since the documents in their entirety were subject to production under
the 1996 Code, the Court next examined whether there were any other
legal provisions that exempted the materials from production.245 As to
the warrants, it found none.246 As a matter of law, the warrants must be
shown to the subject of the search at the time of the search, and therefore
it was an abuse of discretion for the police and prosecutor to claim that
the material contained in the warrant was confidential.247 A further
ground for rejecting the State’s argument was that the warrant contained
information already known to the subject of the search, i.e., the name of
the search subject and the address of the residence.248 As to the documents underlying the warrants, the Court found that the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code that protected information concerning an ongoing investigation from disclosure formed a basis for refusing production.249 It was not outside the realm of police discretion to claim that confidentiality was required, so the materials were exempted from production.250
This case makes clear that a relationship document need not be a document prepared between the parties, such as a contract.251 The documents
underlying the search warrant were prepared solely by the police authorities for the purpose of presentation to a court, and surely were not designed to create a legal relationship, as traditionally understood, between
the police who prepared them and the search suspect.252 Surely the police
did not intend to find themselves engaged in a legal relationship with
suspects to a crime any more than a prosecutor considers himself as having a legal relationship with an accused. In this sense, the willingness of
the Court to broadly interpret what is a legal relationship document may
have significance. On the other hand, it may be that the case is limited to
documents underlying arrest and search—matters specifically covered by
the Constitution and where the criminal law likely prohibits any meaningful production in any event.
On the same day as the decision in the search and seizure case, the
Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court delivered an opinion regard-

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Case No. 4 (Kyo) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.22-2005.-Kyo-.No.
.4.html.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
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ing the scope of production permitted against the government when the
documents sought might affect the foreign relations of Japan.253 As previously noted, the original rewrite of the document production provisions
of the 1996 Code failed to resolve the issue of how documents possessed
by the government are treated.254 In a subsequent amendment, government documents were made subject to production, but were limited in
certain respects. Documents exempt from production include those that
could harm the foreign relations of Japan, harm national security, or adversely affect negotiations between Japan and a foreign country or international organization.255
In addition, a procedural safeguard was established to give the government a means of objecting to production of documents, although it
was subject to judicial review. A court considering a production request
for potentially prohibited materials must give the government authority
an opportunity to express a reasoned view as to whether production
should be prohibited.256 The court must review the rationale to determine
its validity. If it finds the government’s reasons inadequate, the court
may order production.257
The boundaries of production of government documents were explored
in a case where a citizen of Pakistan sought political asylum in Japan.258
The foreign citizen claimed he was the subject of political retribution and
that there was a warrant for his arrest in Pakistan.259 To support his
253. See Case No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22,
2005), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.
22-2005.-Gyo-Fu-.No..4.html.
254. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
255. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223. Under article 223, the competent government authority in
possession of documents sought to be produced must be advised of the request. If the
authority objects to production, it must present an opinion explaining that the documents
fall within the official secrets exemption of article 220. See id. art. 223, para. 3.
256. The opinion must disclose the grounds for the opinion and the court may order
production if “the opinion is not sufficient to be considered to have reasonable ground.”
Id. art. 223, para. 4.
257. Article 223 lists the following concerns as grounds for refusing to make production: that national security will be impaired, that the trust between Japan and other countries or international organizations will be damaged, that negotiations between Japan and
other countries or international organizations may be compromised, that prevention or
investigation of crimes will be inconvenienced, or that public safety will be compromised. See id. art. 223, paras. 4(1)–4(2). The government may also have grounds for refusing to produce government documents that contain private-party secrets.
258. See Case No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005),
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.222005.-Gyo-Fu-.No..4.html.
259. Id.
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claim, the foreign citizen presented papers to the Minister of Justice, including a copy of the arrest warrant from his home country.260 The Minister of Justice wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and requested
that contact be made with the Pakistani government to determine the validity of the documents.261 The Pakistani government responded to the
inquiry by stating that the arrest and other documents were forgeries.262
The Minister of Foreign Affairs then notified the Justice Ministry and
refugee status was denied.263
To challenge this outcome, the foreign citizen sought production of: (i)
a copy of the initial request from the Minister of Justice to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs (which was in the possession of the Ministry of Justice); and (ii) copies of the correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the foreign government (which were in the possession
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).264 Both Ministers objected to production on the grounds that production would harm relations between Japan
and a foreign power.265 Further, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opined
that the documents exchanged between the governments were generally
considered confidential in customary diplomatic relations, and thus
should not be produced.266 Both Ministers also claimed that the documents were exempt from production because they contained state secrets;
production would harm the public interest and interfere with the performance of public duties. The Tokyo High Court, without conducting an
in camera review, ordered the documents produced. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for an examination into the validity of the claims
made by the Ministers.267
The Supreme Court noted that the question of production involved not
simply whether the ultimate fact disclosed by the correspondence was
secret (i.e., that the foreign government said that the documents provided
to the Japanese government by the alleged refugee were forgeries), but
whether production of the material as a whole would harm diplomatic

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Case No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005),
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.222005.-Gyo-Fu-.No..4.html.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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relations and disclose state secrets.268 In this regard, the Supreme Court
noted that the Ministers claimed that production of the documents would
disclose internal investigative techniques, background information not
provided to the foreign government, and comments about internal political matters in the foreign country, all of which would damage the public
interest if disclosed.269 Because the High Court had neither examined the
documents in camera nor adequately reviewed the Ministry’s rationale,
the matter was remanded for a more thorough examination.270
Although concurring to the remand, Justices Takii and Imai seemed to
sympathize with the Tokyo High Court.271 In their view, the Ministry
may not simply rely on generalities or speculative injury to the public
interest to support a denial of production.272 Rather, the objection to production must provide concrete reasons why production would cause the
public interest to suffer.273
Justice Fukuda also wrote separately.274 His view was that the correspondence between governments constituted a note verbale, and under
customary international law, such correspondence may not be disclosed
absent the consent of the other country.275 Justice Fukuda seems to suggest that if upon examination the government’s objection is unjustified,
the court should then consider whether the foreign state would object to
production. The clear import of his logic is that if the foreign state objects, production should not be ordered.
It is not certain whether there is a majority that would support Justice
Takii’s rationale. Only two Justices have signed on to the Court’s opinion and Justice Fukuda’s view was not discussed in the other opinions.
Nor does Justice Fukuda address whether he approves or disapproves of
the approach taken by Justices Takaii and Imai. What does seem clear is
that, while the Court had some question about the presentations by the
Ministries, it was unwilling to allow production simply because the Ministries had not supported their opinions with concrete reasons—and the
Court was not prepared to allow the High Court to determine the matter
268. Case No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005),
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.222005.-Gyo-Fu-.No..4.html.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. (Takii, J. and Imai, J., concurring).
272. Id.
273. Case No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005),
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.222005.-Gyo-Fu-.No..4.html.
274. Id. (Fukuda, J., concurring).
275. Id.
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without a searching investigation into the Ministries’ rationale, including
an in camera review of the documents. Moreover, at least two Justices
sitting in the Second Petty Bench were prepared to place a substantial
burden on the government when it objects to production of documents
that may be relevant in a civil litigation involving the government. However, the case did not examine whether a more stringent standard would
apply when government documents are sought for use in a private lawsuit in which the government is not a party.
In October 2005, the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to discuss this issue in a case dealing with an industrial accident in which a child worker was injured.276 The Labor Ministry conducted an investigation of the accident pursuant to its statutory authority.277 The Ministry prepared an investigative report that contained government investigators’ opinions on the future steps required to prevent
such accidents, and a factual statement of the investigators’ analysis as to
what had occurred.278 This analysis was based, in large part, on interviews with management and other company personnel.279 In a suit by the
injured child’s family against the company, the family sought disclosure
of the report.280 The Labor Office objected to production, claiming that
the report contained official secrets and that disclosure would discourage
cooperation in future investigations, damaging the government’s ability
to serve the public interest.281 The report disclosed the names of persons
contacted by the office and summarized interviews, but it did not quote
individual statements.282 The various workers contacted during the investigation also objected to production of the report.283 The High Court in
Nagoya refused to order production. The Supreme Court reversed in part
and affirmed in part.284
The Supreme Court noted that the report contained two types of information.285 First, there was information that disclosed opinions of gov276. See Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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ernment workers as to what future action should be taken.286 This information disclosed the government’s investigative techniques, which the
Court concluded were state secrets and the disclosure of which was unwarranted (“Category I materials”).287 The other type of information contained in the report was material based on interviews, reports, and measurements, which the Court concluded, as an initial matter, were the secrets of the employer, not the government.288 The employer’s secret material wound up in the government’s hands as a consequence of the investigation, was of a factual nature, and was not linked to any specific
interviewee.289 The Court ordered production of this material (“Category
II materials”).290
The interaction between the Court’s holdings regarding the two categories of material is instructive. As an initial matter, the Court concluded
that all of the material being sought constituted government secrets.291
Private secret information retains its secret character and becomes a government secret when it comes into the government’s hands as a consequence of the government’s investigation and could damage the government’s ability to perform its public interest functions if disclosed.292
Thus, both categories of information may be denied production if there is
likelihood that production will damage the ability of the government to
carry out its functions in the public interest.293 The Court then turned to
the government’s reasons for objecting to production. It first established
286. Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html.
287. Id. As noted in its discussion of the case, the Court was concerned about two
types of information in the report. One type was “private” (i.e., company) secrets. Under
article 223 of the 1996 Code, when the government possesses documents that disclose a
private party’s technical or business secrets, the government must allow the private party
to object to production and must give the private party an opportunity to present its position as to why the document should not be produced. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, para. 5. The
Court notes that the employees of the corporation objected to production. It is likely that
in addition to giving the company an opportunity to object, the government possessor of
the documents also gave the employees an opportunity to object.
288. See Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html.
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the appropriate standard for evaluating the government’s reasons for
nondisclosure. Here, the Court adopted the same approach as Justices
Takaii and Imai (although it did not cite them or otherwise refer to the
July decision), holding that there must be a specific or concrete showing
that there exists a likelihood that the public interest will be damaged by
production.294 An abstract possibility that production could hurt the public interest is not sufficient to deny production.295 Second, the Court determined that the likelihood of damage to the public interest must be
based on the content of the documents sought.
As the documents sought in the instant case contained two different
categories of information, the Court dealt with each in turn. As to the
Category I materials, the Court found that production should not be
made.296 This determination seems to mirror the determination in the Fuji
Bank line of cases. In both the public and private sector, the Court is
concerned about keeping decision-making lines of communication open
and allowing the unedited and unfettered statements of employees. Accordingly, the Category II material need not be produced.297 As to Category I material, the Court recognized the arguments based on privacy
concerns of workers at the company and the potential inability of the
government to properly carry out future investigations.298 The Court rejected both arguments.299
The employee privacy argument was rejected as a factual matter since
the report itself failed to disclose who said what.300 Moreover, the report
mixed interview materials with other materials and opinions of the investigators to such an extent that the statements of individual employees or
directors could not be discerned.301 As a consequence, the Court found
there was no real loss of privacy at stake.302 Further, production would
not hinder the ability of the government to perform future investigations
since the statutory law required employer-employee cooperation with

294. Case
available at
11.html.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Case
available at
11.html.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.

No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..

No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
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government investigators.303 As the two types of information in the report could be readily segregated, there was no reason not to order production of the Category I materials, and the Court did so.304
In a case involving the Sendai City Assembly,305 it was alleged that
funds disbursed to various political factions to use in research under the
Local Autonomy Law306 were improperly allocated.307 As a consequence,
the plaintiff sought repayment of such sums to the municipal government.308 In the course of the litigation, and to prove the validity of the
claim, the plaintiff sought an order that would require production of the

303. Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html. The Labor Safety and Sanitation Law requires cooperation with government
investigations. See Rōdō anzen eisei hō [Labor Safety and Sanitation Law], Law No. 57
of 1972, art. 100, translated it EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 8070 (1999).
304. See Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html.
305. Japan is divided into numerous prefectures and municipal governments that serve
local governmental functions. The Sendai City Assembly is a municipal government that
is part of the Miyagi Prefecture. The Japanese Constitution provides that prefectural governors and councils are to be elected, rather than appointed by the central government.
See KENPŌ, art. 93, para. 2. Japanese prefectures perform many agency functions for the
central government. Japanese prefectural governors can be ordered to perform functions
on behalf of the national government by the Minister, provided the Minister’s order is
within the scope of his authority. See, e.g., Okinawa Mandamus Case, Case No. 90
(Gyo-Tsu) of 1996, (Sup. Ct., Sept. 28, 1996) translation available at http://www.courts.
go.jp/english/judgments/text/1996.08.28-1996-Gyo-Tsu-No.90.html.
306. See Chihō jichi hō [Local Autonomy Law], Law No. 67 of 1947, available at
http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/1999/00168/mokuji.htm. The Local Autonomy Law
permitted the prefectural governments to provide funding for the various political factions in the prefectural assemblies for the purpose of conducting research. See id., art.
100.
307. See Case No. 2 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 9 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.11.10-2005.-Gyo-Fu.No..2.html. A prefecture enacted a local ordinance in conformity with the Local Autonomy Law that required the factions to provide certain information concerning studies
done with allocated funds. But, the factions were not required to provide the study results
to the public or the prefecture government. The results of the study were, of course, made
available to the members of the faction performing the study. Id.
308. Id. While plaintiffs in such a taxpayer suit would likely lack standing in the
United States, the Administrative Case Litigation Law permits such suits in Japan. See
Gyōsei jiken soshōhō [Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 5,
translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2391 (1999). See also Chihō jichi hō [Local
Autonomy Law], Law No. 67 of 1947, available at http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/
1999/00168/mokuji.htm.
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studies.309 The issue before the Court was whether the reports were selfuse documents and thus exempt from production.310
The Court began its analysis by stating the basic principles for the selfuse exception: (i) a document must be prepared solely for the use of the
holder or those within its organization and was not intended for disclosure; (ii) disclosure is likely to violate privacy or prevent or inhibit employees from making unfettered opinions and decisions; (iii) a significant
or at least not insignificant injury to the holder of the document in the
event of disclosure; and (iv) no special circumstances exist that would
warrant production, even if all of the above considerations were met.311
In applying these principles, the Court recognized the necessity for
transparency since public monies were being expended, but noted that
the local ordinance provided that information concerning the studies be
filed with the prefecture, although not the final report or its substance.312
The Court then noted the highly political nature of such reports and the
obvious reasons for not providing copies to either opposition factions in
the Assembly or to the executive branch of the prefectural government.313 Both privacy concerns of persons who may have assisted in the
compilation of the report and the risk that those opinions may not be objectively voiced if the report’s contents were published counseled in favor of holding them self-use documents.314 In addition, it could be expected that production of the report would cause significant problems for
the faction preparing it, both with the executive branch and competing
factions.315 As a result, the Court deemed such reports self-use documents and exempt from production.316
Justice Yokoo dissented.317 In his view, research reports are subject to
review by an outside person who is not a member of the faction undertaking the study.318 This conclusion follows from an analysis of the legal
basis for spending public monies for the report and the need to ensure
309. See Case No. 2 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 9 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.11.10-2005.-Gyo-Fu.No..2.html.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Case No. 2 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 9 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.11.10-2005.-Gyo-Fu.No..2.html.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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that public funds are properly spent.319 Justice Yokoo reasoned that since
the study report may be reviewed by an outside person, it fails to meet an
essential element of a self-use document; namely, that there is no expectation that the document will be disclosed to other than the holder of the
document or those within its organization.320 The dissent disagreed with
the majority on this essential issue: whether the laws governing the reports contemplated disclosure to persons other than faction members.321
However, the dissent did not disagree as to the proper test to determine
whether a document is a self-use document.322 Thus, the dissent and the
majority were of the view that if the report met the basic requirements
listed above, it would be a self-use document.323 The disagreement was
over whether the preparer of the report contemplated that the report
would be disclosed to persons other than the preparing faction and its
members.
In the most recent self-use document case to be decided by the Supreme Court—yet another dispute between a bank and a customer— the
Court appears to have further relaxed the restraints on production of an
ongoing bank’s records.324 A bank claimed that it had lent money to a

319. Case No. 2 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 9 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.11.10-2005.-Gyo-Fu.No..2.html.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Case No. 39 of 2005, 60 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 2006), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.02.17-2005.-Kyo-.No..
39.html. This decision is consistent with the views of Professor Tanaguchi:
Under the New Code which has made the production duty a “general duty,” the
same reasoning should not apply. If the court nevertheless uses the previous
definition of “internal document” for defining a (4)(d) document, the exception
will be too broad. For example, a so called ringisho (circular letter within a
corporation for a major decision making) or a fax correspondence between a
branch office and the corporate headquarters has been considered as “internal”
and not subject to a production order. Under the New Code, only a limited
category of personal documents protected by the rule of privacy should be
privileged.
Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 778. However, Professor Taniguchi’s suggestion that a circular letter for major decision-making should not be considered an exempt document was
rejected in both the Fuji Bank case and in Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup.
Ct., Dec. 14, 2000). See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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customer.325 The customer stated that he thought he was buying insurance, not taking a loan, and the mistake voided the deal.326 In an effort to
prove the mistake, the customer sought production of internal documents
of the bank.327 The documents were communications from the bank’s
head office to its branches detailing the bank’s policy of selling variable
insurance together with loans.328
The bank argued that the documents were prepared solely for the use
of the holder (i.e., the bank) and hence fell within the self-use exception
to production.329 The Court acknowledged that the documents had been
prepared solely for the internal use of the bank and its employees.330 But,
because the documents were informational and not prepared in the course
of decision making, the Court concluded that production would not adversely affect the bank’s ability to make decisions in the future.331 In
other words, unlike Fuji Bank, where the Court found the documents
were part of the decision-making process and production would hamper
future decision-making by impairing the free flow of information and
opinions, these documents merely reported bank policy.332 Consequently,
the Court found that a key element in the self-use document analysis was
missing—namely, that production would impose any disadvantage to the
future operations of the bank.333 The documents were ordered produced.334
III. CONTEXT, CUSTOM AND COMMUNITY—SUPPORT FOR AND SUPPORTED BY THE DECISIONS
A. Introduction
The Fuji Bank decision placed a severe limitation on the production of
documents in a holder’s possession by broadly interpreting the new statutory self-use exception. Yet the decision did not completely exempt self325. Case
available at
39.html.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Case
available at
39.html.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.

No. 39 of 2005, 60 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 2006), translation
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.02.17-2005.-Kyo-.No..

No. 39 of 2005, 60 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 2006), translation
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.02.17-2005.-Kyo-.No..
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use documents from production under the 1996 Code. Rather, the Court
focused on two characteristics in order to assess whether a self-use
document could be considered exempt from production: (i) the document’s production would work some significant hardship to the possessor of the document, or (ii) there were special circumstances warranting
production notwithstanding its status as a self-use document. Fuji Bank
was viewed by both bengoshi and lower court judges as a severe restriction on document production.335 However, subsequent decisions have
significantly modified Fuji Bank, allowing parties greater access to
documents while simultaneously developing a doctrine that supports
Japanese customs and community values.
Japan is a collective, or group, society, whereas the United States is an
individualist society.336 American society places a high value on individual rights, and it is believed that society in general—as an aggregation of
individuals—will ultimately benefit from the protection of individual
rights. Still, the concept of rights in the United States is an individual
one. In contrast, in Japan the group or collective is significantly more
important than the individual.
Collective societies tend to be “high context” societies, which means
that interactions may only be understood by taking into account the entire context of the communication, including the parties to the communication, body language, and the customs that are prevalent in the society.337 In collective societies, “group goals have precedence over indi-

335. See Goodman, Japan, supra note 9, at 582–85. See also Haley, Heisei Renewal,
supra note 8, at 6 n.6.
336. See EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE TODAY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 128
(Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (1977); Charles R. Fenwick, Culture, Philosophy and Crime:
The Japanese Experience, 9 INT’L J. COMP.& APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 67, 71–72 (1985).
Haim Weinberg summarizes the views of Hofsted and Kotani, both of which are relevant
in this regard:
Hofstede (1991) describes Japanese society as one “in which people from birth
onwards, are integrated into strong, cohesive subgroups, which, throughout
people’s lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioned loyalty.” This is why Kotani (1999) hypothesizes that when Japanese people are in
a group, the intense cohesiveness is experienced as if there were a common
self.
Haim Weinberg, The Culture of the Group and Groups from Different Cultures, 36
GROUP ANALYSIS 253, 260 (2003). See also Kim & Lawson, supra note 27, at 498–99.
337. See Richard L. Wiseman et al., A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Compliance Gaining: China, Japan, and the United States, INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 1, 4 (1995)
(“The dimensions of individualism/collectivism and context are related. That is, the predominant mode of communication in collective cultures is high context while the primary
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viduals’ goals”338 and “the group is the center of decision-making.”339
Not only is Japan a group society, but is also a society in which hierarchy
and status matter significantly.340
The concepts of hierarchy and status were first solidified and stratified
in the late fifteenth century by the unifier and civil ruler of Japan, Hideoshi, and then hermetically sealed in the sixteenth and later centuries by
the Tokugawa Shoguns.341 “[S]tatus and group lines created the vertical
means of communication in individualistic cultures is low context.”). See also infra notes
379–82 and accompanying text.
338. Wiseman et al., supra note 337, at 3–4.
339. Id. at 6. This characteristic of high context societies has implications for the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the need to keep the decision-making process open and to
protect the free flow of information and opinions through restricting the production of
documents reflecting opinions and information outside the group.
340. Charles Lockhart, Using Grid-Group Theory to Explain Distinctive Japanese
Political Institutions, 19 E. ASIA 51, 58 (2001).
341. See JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EDWIN O. REISCHAUER & ALBERT M. CRAIG, EAST ASIA
TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION 406–07 (1973); John Henry Wigmore, Introduction, in
1 LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN 6 (John Henry Wigmore ed., 1969). Although
Japan has had an Emperor from as early as the seventh century, see Donald H. Shively &
William H. McCullough, Introduction, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 1, 3–4
(Donald H. Shively & William H. McCullough eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999), from
at least the twelfth century forward, power resided in the military, or Samurai, class. See
Jeffrey P. Mass, The Kamakura Bakufu, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 46, 46–
47 (Kozo Yamamura ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990). After Japan successfully resisted
the efforts of Kublai Khan to bring Japan within his orb in the thirteenth century, the
military government of Japan (the Kamakura Shogunate) collapsed and Japan entered a
period wherein power resided in war lords who controlled territory known as Han. See
Ishii Susumu, The Decline of the Kamakura Bafuku, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
JAPAN 128, 137–148, 160–174 (Kozo Yamamura ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990). For
the next two hundred years, these war lords fought each other, but none was powerful
enough to reunify the country. See John Whitney Hall, The Muromachi Bakufu, in 3 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 175, 225–230 (Kozo Yamamura ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1990). Finally, at the end of the sixteenth century Toyotomi Hideyoshi successfully
brought all of Japan under his military rule. See Asao Naohiro, The Sixteenth-Century
Unification, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 40, 45–50 (John Whitney Hall ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). When Hideyoshi died in 1598, a struggle ensued between
lords supporting Hideoshi’s minor son and those supporting Tokugawa Ieyasu. Tokugawa was successful and, in the early seventeenth century, was named Shogun by the
Emperor. See John Whitney Hall, The Bakuhan System, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
JAPAN 128, 141–147 (John Whitney Hall ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). Succeeding
members of the Tokugawa family were named Shogun by later Emperors and the Tokugawa family controlled a unified Japan for the next 250 years—a period known as the
Tokugawa Shogunate. The Shogunate came to an end with the Meiji Restoration. See
Marius B. Jansen, The Meiji Restoration, in 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 308,
353–359 (Marius B. Jansen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989). The Tokugawa Shogunate
was a period of high feudalism in Japan characterized by a strict class system headed by
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and horizontal boundaries which defined and confined the individual
within his society.”342 Further, status was the defining characteristic of
law during the feudal period.343 During Japan’s feudal period most of the
population lived in villages that were semiautonomous and where the
self-policing, five-household group organization created joint responsibility.344 But hierarchy and status were a critical element of life, whether
one was in the elite samurai (warrior) class or the peasant farming
class.345 Belonging to your appropriate group in society was an essential
element of life.
Chief among the status-binding institutions was the family system (the
ie). The ie was a household system wherein authority over the family
resided in the head of the house, who controlled the property of the house
and had significant decision-making authority over house members.346
Members of society belonged first to their house; second to their community (such as their village, their block in town, or their military organization, etc.); and third, to neighborhood groups within their commu-

the Samurai class. See Wakita Osamu, The Social and Economic Consequences of Unification, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 96, 121–125 (John Whitney Hall ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991); Kenneth B. Pyle, Meiji Conservatism, in 5 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 674, 708–713 (Marius B. Jansen ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1989).
342. John W. Hall, Rule by Status in Tokugawa Japan, 1 J. JAPAN. STUD. 39, 45
(1974).
343. Yoshirō Hiramatsu, Tokugawa Law, 14 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 40–41 (Dan F. Henderson trans.). Yoshirō Hiramatsu explains:
In Tokugawa times, status discipline and legal discipline had inseparable structures. . . . Status discipline regulated the people . . . . It showed the superiorinferior relationships within the groups. . . . Ethics and humanity were usually
advocated for each social status based on superior-inferior relations transcending all . . . . In daily life, status norms were regarded as the primary obligation,
and the penal law protected them.
Id.
344. See Macfarlane, supra note 19, at 369; HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 39, at
32.
345. HERMAN OOMS, TOKUGAWA VILLAGE PRACTICE: CLASS, STATUS, POWER, LAW
338 (1996) (“Hierarchy seems to be present in all societies at all levels as the result of an
informing ideological principle . . . .”); id. at 168 (“Hierarchical lineage structure seems
to have determined all important relationships within the village.”).
346. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 25, at 90–92. See also William
Burke, Creative Response and Adaptive Response in Japanese Society, 21 AM. J. ECON.
& SOC. 103 (1962).

178

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 33:1

nity (such as the five-household groups).347 In this setting, collective decision-making and codependence became ingrained in society and a culture based on “mutual, interdependent relations and reliance” developed.348 Given this culture and its emphasis on hierarchy and status, it is
but a short step to realize that “legal relations” flowed from group and
status structure.349
The efforts of the judicial branch to create a legal doctrine favoring the
lower-status class in its conflict with the upper classes evidence the persistence of hierarchical and status elements that characterized Tokugawa
Japan in modern Japanese society. Thus, tenants are favored over landlords, employees over employers, franchisees over franchisors and distributors over manufacturers, leveling the status divide between them.350
Modern legislation integrates this theme by providing consumers with
protections against business.351
Notwithstanding the post-war Americanized constitution that emphasizes individual rights, Japan remains a communal society that recognizes hierarchy and class status. Judges, as part of the community, apply
the common sense of the community in rendering judicial decisions that
uphold community values.352 A compelling example of the judiciary’s
need to apply community values and the common sense of the society is

347. See OOMS, supra note 345, at 80 (“The five-household groups were adopted nationwide in the mid 1630s in order to establish multipurpose subvillage administrative
units . . . .”).
348. Kinko Ito, Nihon Shakatowa Nanika: Fukuzatsukeimo Shitenkara [What is Japanese Society?—From the Perspective of the Complex System], 5 JAP. STUD. REV. 108, 110
(2001) (book review).
349. In Tokugawa Japan, households, rather than individuals, were the subject of regulations and parties to disputes. OOMS, supra note 345, at 5. See also Richard B. Parker,
Law, Language and the Individual in Japan and the United States, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 179,
200 (1988) (“If it is true that Japan is a society of ‘contextuals’ rather than ‘individuals’
and that the use of language in Japan is highly contextual, then we should expect that law
in Japan to also be ‘contextual.’ It is.”).
350. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
351. See, e.g., Consumer Contract Law, Law No. 61 of 2000, art. 3, 4, 8, translation
available at http://www.asianlii.org/jp/legis/laws/cca2000an61o2000274/ (giving consumers the right to withdraw consent to a contract in various situations, requiring consumer contracts to be written in “clear and plain terms,” and voiding various contract
provisions that place business in a preferred position over consumers); Arbitration Law,
Law No. 138 of 2003, Supp. Prov., art.3, translation available at The Arbitration Law
Follow-up Research Group, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/arbitration
law.pdf (Mar. 2004).
352. See, e.g., Hiroshi Itoh, How Judges Think in Japan, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 775
(1970).
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found in the Gokoku Enshrinement case.353 In this case, the Christian
wife of a deceased Self-Defense Force member contested the enshrinement of her husband at a Shinto Shrine dedicated to members of the military establishment.354 The plaintiff based her claim on the Japanese Constitution’s protection of the freedom of religion—in this case her religion
was Christianity, while the religious affiliation of the Shrine was
Shinto.355 Her husband apparently had no religious affiliation.356 The
Court concluded that the enshrinement was a “private law matter” between the wife and the Shrine.357 As such, it did not implicate government action.358 Thus, the constitution was not directly applicable to the
Shrine’s actions.359
The Court then turned to the issue of whether, as a private law matter,
the enshrinement was a violation of article 90 of the Civil Code that
voids juridical acts that are contrary to good faith.360 The Court found
that the enshrinement did not violate any of the wife’s legal rights, so
there was no violation of the Civil Code.361 The concurring opinion of
Justice Nagashima is instructional. Justice Nagashima pointed out that
although the wife was Christian, the other surviving relatives of the deceased were Buddhist or Shinto.362 In his view, there was no reason to
prioritize the wife’s religious beliefs over the beliefs of the other family
members.363 Similarly, Justice Sakaue was concerned about the effect of
353. See Case No. 902 of 1982, 42 MINSHŪ 277 (Sup. Ct., June 1, 1988), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1988.06.01-1982-O-No. 902.
html.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Case No. 902 of 1982, 42 MINSHŪ 277 (Sup. Ct., June 1, 1988), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1988.06.01-1982-O-No. 902.html.
359. Id. The government, in the form of the Self-Defense Force, did play a role in the
enshrinement when it provided data and administrative assistance to the shrine. The government also supported the enshrinement by having an officer attend meetings concerning enshrinement and by cooperating with the Veterans Association, which was instrumental in securing enshrinement at this particular site. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Case No. 902 of 1982, 42 MINSHŪ 277 (Sup. Ct., June 1, 1988), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1988.06.01-1982-O-No. 902.html.
363. Id. (Nagashima, J., concurring). Justice Nagaishima remarked:
There is no legal grounds for giving priority to a surviving spouse over surviving parents or children with regard to mourning and honoring the memory of
the deceased, and it is obvious that things would be out of control if relatives
who believe in different religions may seek legal remedies against each other
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the wife’s actions on the other family members. He would have gone
further than the Court or Justice Nagashima, and would have recognized
the need for the individual to subordinate her personal “right” to the
“rights” of others in the community.364 Professor Haley, in reference to
this case, has said:
The Yamaguchi Shrine case, along with the landmark 1977, 1983, and
1997 Supreme Court decisions, together reflect judicial deference to
community values. . . . Stripped of legal garb . . . the case involves a
challenge to community practice and an established pattern of life. The
plaintiff petitioned for the state to intervene to protect her individual interest and beliefs against the actions taken by and on behalf of the community of which she was a part. The judicial response was refusal. Acting through the courts, the state denied her the protection she sought.
This I submit, is the crux of the case and much of Japanese law.365

More recently, the Supreme Court used community values to inform
legal relations between parties.366 This decision recognized a common

because of the discomfort for the other relative’s religious action of mourning
and honoring the memory of the deceased. Thus religious tolerance is necessary
even with relatives among each other.
Id.
364. Id. (Sakaue, J., concurring). As Justice Sakaue explained:
It would considerably contradict our common sense or socially accepted idea if
anyone is free to worship or to pray for the deceased with a religious ceremony
which is against the will of his or her surviving relatives such as his spouse, descendant or parents and if those relatives are not allowed to oppose and has to
tolerate such activity of others as long as it is related to religion no matter how
their mental peace are disturbed. . . . This is the very case where conflict of personal rights of surviving relatives occurred, in which case the tolerance that the
majority opinion mentioned is required. Therefore, even if the religious ceremony of praying or mourning by other close relatives or those conducted according to their will is against one’s will, he or she should be tolerant of it and,
unless there is such special circumstances as to give priority to his or her mental peace, the infringement of his or her personal rights should not be considered unlawful since it is within the limitation to be endured.
Id.
365. HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55, at 196. However, the constitution did attempt to
make that transition. Id. at 199. For example, the constitution provides that “[a]ll of the
people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic
or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.” KENPŌ, art.
14, para. 1.
366. See Case No. 354 of 2005, 61 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 8, 2007), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2007.03.08-2005.-Gyo-Hi.No..354.html.
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law spouse’s rights against the national pension system upon the death of
her husband, even though the spouses were related (uncle and niece) and
thus could not enter into a lawful marriage under Japan’s Civil Code.367
The Supreme Court recognized that there were strong social policy reasons for prohibiting the marriage of such close relatives and further recognized that such marriages were, as a general rule “significantly unethical or prejudicial to the public interest.”368 Nonetheless the Court noted
that:
[A]ccording to the facts mentioned above, in the appellant’s community, due to such regional characteristic, marriage between relatives
took place somewhat frequently . . . . [I]t was acknowledged without
resistance among their relatives and also publicly accepted in their
community . . . .369

Although the American Occupation did not replace the traditional
Japanese cultural values of community with American values of individualism,370 it did have a significant effect on Japanese life, including
the replacement of the traditional ie with a more nuclear family.371 The
367. Id. Given this community acceptance of the common law marriage, the fact that
the uncle and niece lived together as husband and wife for forty-two years and had two
children born of the common law marriage, the Court found that the “spouse” was entitled to recognition by the national pension system. Given that one principal reason to
prohibit marriage between an uncle and niece is to avoid circumstances where they might
have children, forty-two years of cohabitation and the birth of two children might just as
easily be cited as reasons for denying benefits. Here, the community acceptance of the
practice outweighed the Civil Code’s prohibition, at least where surviving spouse benefits
under the national pension system was concerned. See id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See Lockhart, supra note 340, at 61–62. Lockhart’s observations in this regard are
particularly apt:
American postwar occupation, with its imposition of liberal democratic institutions, mitigated many aspects of the starkly differentiating hierarchical practices of the prewar period. . . . Yet some aspects of social practice routinely deviate sharply from these formal standards. . . . [T]he thoroughly hierarchical labor market is riddled with preferences based on family background and age. As
a result, formally equal Japanese citizens . . . routinely relate to one another, not
as relative equals, but as social superiors and subordinates.
Id.
371. The American-drafted Japanese Constitution is quite explicit in rejecting the old
family system:
Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be
maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and
wife as a basis. . . . With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheri-
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growth of the economy after the war also had the effect of loosening
group ties that centered on the “home village.”
B. Principles Governing Document Production by Corporations and the
Government
The Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence concerning production of
documents can only be fully understood by taking into account Japan’s
group orientation, its hierarchy and the importance of status, its highcontext communication style, and the significant role of the employing
corporation in modern Japanese society. Understanding the function of
document production as merely a means to present evidence in a civil
litigation is insufficient to appreciate the Supreme Court’s language and
the thrust of its decisions. Social and cultural factors influence several
aspects of the Court’s decisions, including: (i) the limitation of the selfuse exception to documents whose production will work a disadvantage
to the holder of the document; (ii) the emphasis on privacy; and (iii) the
significance of the decision-making document in the group-oriented culture of the Japanese corporation. For example, the Supreme Court’s creation of the significant disadvantage requirement as a necessary condition
for application of the self-use doctrine in the Fuji Bank case echoes the
Court’s acceptance of interference with privacy as a significant hardship
that may be sufficient to avoid production. Neither disadvantage nor privacy is found in the statute, and privacy is nowhere explained in the Fuji
Bank decision.372
While the concept of disadvantage is not found in the language of article 220 of the 1996 Code, the statute does exempt from production
documents that contain information that is covered by a privilege set out
in article 197, paragraph 1.373 Under this privilege, technical or profestance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and
the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and
the essential equality of the sexes.
See KENPŌ, art. 24. See generally Kurt Steiner, The Revision of the Civil Code of Japan:
Provisions Affecting the Family, 9 FAR E.Q. 169 (1950).
372. The concept of disadvantage is also not included in the Ministry of Justice’s manual explaining the application of the self-use doctrine. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at
302. The Justice Department Manual is quoted to the effect that the old rule of self-use
documents is incorporated into the statutory language. Under the old rule, there was no
need for, and no judicial opinions dealing with, an exception based on disadvantage.
373. Under the 1996 Code, the provisions dealing with witness testimony precede
those dealing with documents. Article 197, which is contained in the witness portion of
the Code, deals with witness privileges. Pursuant to article 197, paragraph 1, government
officials may refuse to testify about official secrets unless the supervising government has
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sional secrets contained in documents need not be disclosed. As noted in
one of the cases discussed above, the holder argued that the electronic
schematic of its telephone equipment was a technical or professional secret that should not be subject to production.374 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the High Court to determine whether the schematic
qualified as a technical secret, stating:
The term “technical or professional secret” as provided by Art. 197,
para. 1, subpara. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be understood
as matters, which, if made public, their social value of which would decline and the activities using these will be difficult, or will seriously affect the profession and make it difficult to continue the profession.375

Thus, under one subpart of article 220 of the Code, there is explicit reference (by way of incorporation) to the concept of disadvantage as it relates to the issue of document production. It is possible that the Court,
reading the self-use document provision in the context of article 220, was
persuaded that the concept of disadvantage also permeated the self-use
exception.376
Among the various forms of significant disadvantage that could meet
the self-use exception, the Court specifically mentions both privacy and
limits on the decision-making process of individuals and organizations.377 These are not the only possible categories of disadvantage; they
are merely illustrations of disadvantage to the holder of a document that
granted permission for such testimony. See MINSOHŌ, art. 197, para. 1 (referencing article
191, which governs examination of a government official regarding official secrets).
Article 197, paragraph 2 incorporates the more familiar evidentiary privileges such as
attorney-client and physician-patient. See id. art. 197, para. 2. Article 197, paragraph 3
permits a witness to refuse to testify if the testimony would disclose technical or professional secrets. See id. art. 197, para. 3.
374. See supra notes 136–54 and accompanying text.
375. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No.
20.html.
376. At first glance, traditional privileges do not appear to involve a determination of
disadvantage. After all, a patient need not make a showing of disadvantage to prevent
testimony concerning his medical records. However, the traditional privileges are all
founded on disadvantage or privacy concerns. For instance, the doctor-patient privilege
deals with personal private materials, while the attorney-client privilege implicates both
private matters and disadvantage. Just as the Supreme Court has bundled the concept of
privacy into disadvantage, it has bundled article 197, paragraph 2 into the disadvantage
definition.
377. Although the Court has grounded its determination that there was a significant
disadvantage solely on the latter. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct.,
Mar. 10, 2000), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/
text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No.20.html.
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call for denial of production. Precisely whose privacy the Court appears
prepared to protect is not stated. There are several possibilities—the privacy of the corporate entity, the privacy of the author(s) of the document,
or the privacy of corporate employees who provided information incorporated in the document.
The fact that the Court did not specifically define whose privacy was
involved may trouble an American observer, but this is merely a reflection of the difference in cultural communication between the United
States and Japan. What Americans may view as a failure to expressly
state something in a conversation or court decision may simply be a reflection of cultural differences. Japan is a high context society wherein
contextual factors affect the meaning of words, rules, actions, etc.,
whereas the United States is a low context society.378 In a low context
society, it is expected that communications will be more precise and specific than would be expected in a high context society.379 In contrast,
vagueness in communication is a key characteristic of a high context society.380 Indeed, vagueness may be a means of permitting later reconsid378. See generally EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE (1976); EDWARD T. HALL &
MILDRED REED HALL, HIDDEN DIFFERENCES: DOING BUSINESS WITH THE JAPANESE
(1987); TAKIE SUGIYAMA LEBRA, JAPANESE PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR 46–48 (Univ. Press
Hawaii 1977). See also Martin Rösch & Kay G. Segler, Communication with Japanese,
27 MGMT. INT’L REV. 56, 60 (1987) (“In countries such as Japan with a highly contexted
mode of communication a message will generally carry a smaller part of explicitly stated
information; i.e., the context carries more information than it would in countries with a
low level of context information . . . .”); Kristiina Jokinen & Graham Wilcock, Contextual Inferences in Intercultural Communication, 19 SKY J. LINGUISTICS 291, 291–92
(2006) (“In the low context culture, everything is fully spelled out . . . . In a high context
culture . . . communicators assume a lot of shared knowledge, experience, and world
view . . . less is made explicit and much more is implicit . . . .”).
379. See Judy Minot, On Common Sense, www.kokikai.org/. Judy Minot elaborates on
this distinction as follows:
In high context cultures a lot of communication takes place through “things not
said.” In low context cultures people mean what they say (or at least they think
they do) in any case people place highest value on explicit communication
through words. If someone doesn’t understand something in a low context, they
ask questions. In a high context culture they would find out the answer by looking around them, seeing how people interact, understanding from the context.
Id.
380. Hiroshi Hasegawa, Japanese Linguistic Ambiguity, INT’L J. LANGUAGE SOC’Y &
CULTURE (2000), http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/Journal/ARTICLES/Hasegawa/
Hasegawa2.html. Hiroshi Hasegawa discusses this in detail:
High context is the situation in which human interaction can be exercised exchanging less information such as knowledge, concept and experience between
individuals. . . . This implies that more and accurate information is required
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eration of the question as a consensus begins to form on a meaning.381
Thus, to understand what the Court meant by its reference to privacy as a
significant hardship factor, one must look to its context.
Just as the initial draftsman of Japan’s civil law system had to invent
Japanese words in an attempt to capture concepts of Western law that did
not exist and could not be written or said in Japanese, so too do modern
Japanese freely borrow words from another language.382 But the concept
behind the word may be quite different in Japanese.383 Indeed, “the assumption that the same words [in the different languages of English and
Japanese] have the same meaning may well be misleading.”384
It seems obvious that disclosure documents prepared for a decisionmaking process containing views of the bank employees would implicate
their individual privacy concerns. How, then, can it be explained that the
Supreme Court allowed the views of the employees to be disclosed
through production of the bank’s records once the bank no longer issued
loans?385 While the Court was concerned with the privacy rights of employees of the ongoing Fuji Bank, it was apparently unconcerned about
the privacy rights of the employees of the bank that had failed and was in

with precise words/phrases/topic selection in undeviating speech pattern in order to minimize the communication failure. . . . In the consideration of the interacting procedure created by most Japanese people, they are categorized as
the high context personalities.
Id.
381. See Joan C. Howden, Competitive and Collaborative Style: American Men and
Women, American Men and Japanese Men, IV:1 INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 49, 54
(1994) (“Deliberate vagueness is employed in Japanese language not to show weakness
and subordination, but to leave room for arrangements and planning to be conducted or
negotiated among many members of a collectivist group, or a network of those concerned.”).
382. See Kenneth K. Port, The Japanese International Law “Revolution”: International Human Rights Law and Its Impact in Japan, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 139, 166–67
(1991) (discussing how the Japanese do not share the Western concept of “rights”).
383. For example, a Japanese “mansion” is generally a small apartment in a concrete
building with a door person, not a “mansion” as visualized in the United States. A Japanese “mansion” is an apartment that is distinguished from a Japanese “apartment” by the
nature of the building in which it is located.
384. Rösch & Segler, supra note 378, at 62. In Japanese, a word may even have different meanings based on its context. “Even in the Japanese language, context to a large
extent determines the significance of a word. Japanese allows a fairly substantial range of
interpretations; the actually intended meaning of a word will only be clear when all its
circumstances are taken into account.” Id. at 61.
385. See Case. No. 15 of 2001, 55 MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001),
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001Kyo-No.15.html and supra notes 179–92 and accompanying text.
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liquidation. To American eyes, the employees’ privacy interests would
appear to be the same in both instances, rendering the decisions inconsistent. The answer may reside in the different meaning given to the concept of privacy rights in Japan. Privacy, when used in the context of a
corporate employee’s relationship with her employer, may not carry the
individual or personal connotation that it has in American law. In the
analysis of the Supreme Court of Japan, privacy is seen in a group context rather than in a personal context.
The interpretation of employee privacy in the context of the document
production decisions may have additional roots in the varying nature of
the concept of rights as understood in Japan. Rights may be individual in
some contexts (such as when a female employee sues because she has
been sexually harassed by her employer), but group-oriented in others
(such as when the government passes special laws to better the economic
conditions of the so-called Burakumin, but fails to pass laws that prohibit
discrimination against them—even though they are Japanese citizens386—or fails to pass laws that protect the indigenous people of Japan,
who are also Japanese citizens). In addition, rights may also be understood as relating to the contextual relationship in which the right is in386. See Leslie D. Alldritt, The Burakumin: The Complicity of Japanese Buddhism in
Oppression and an Opportunity for Liberation, J. OF BUDDHIST ETHICS 7 (2000),
http://www.buddhistethics.org/7/alldritt001.html. Leslie Alldritt describes the plight of
the Burakumin as follows:
Through sustained political activism, the burakumin have caused legislation to
be passed since the war that has dramatically bettered conditions for themselves. These improvements have come primarily in such issues as better housing and education. . . . [T]he burakumin . . . continue to suffer from, in comparison to the majority Japanese, higher illness rates, higher unemployment,
lower wages for the same jobs, illegal lists that corporations buy and use to
avoid hiring buraku people, discrimination in marriage, and myriad abusive and
discriminatory attacks on their person and position.
Id. Frank Upham criticizes the current Burakumin policy as follows:
If . . . the goal of dowa policy is the full acceptance of Burakumin by the majority, the present mode of affirmative action seems, at least in the short run,
anomalous if not deliberately destructive of the goal. It stresses precisely the
programs which will intensify Buraku isolation and ignores those that would
bring them into the mainstream. It is as if the present intent was to improve
their lot as a group in a narrow economic sense while ignoring the facilitation
of individual entry into majority life.
Frank K. Upham, Ten Years of Affirmative Action for Japanese Burakumin: A Preliminary Report on the Law on Special Measures for Dowa Projects, 13 LAW IN JAPAN 39, 69
(1980). See also UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY IN POST WAR JAPAN, supra note 64, at
78–124.
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voked. In the case of corporate documents, the right may be one that exists in relation to the employees’ relationship with their employer.
Because individual identity in Japan is grounded on group membership,387 where “the primary principle is to safeguard the harmony of the
group, and the main challenge for the individual is to find their place
within a wider fellowship,” 388 it is easy to comprehend a system where
the privacy interest is understood in group terms, i.e., what is at stake is
not the right of individual employees to privacy, but the right to privacy
of the company collectively.
An individual’s identity in Japan is grounded on the individual’s group
identity:
The strong sense of belongingness as a stake for self-identity, reinforced by collectivism and conformism, calls for the individual’s total
commitment and loyalty to his group. . . . These mutual obligations of
loyalty and total protection are an established practice in the Japanese
employment system, particularly in large corporations. . . . In such a
system, the employee not only is obligated to stay on in the same company. . . but he cannot afford to move. Chances are that he will not be
offered a job from the outside. . . . All this reflects the tendency of the
Japanese employee to find his identity in belongingness rather than in
the cultivation and exhibition of professional expertise. . . . Employment seems to mean, above all, the teaching and learning of the employee’s role in relation to the employer and other senior employees,
with emphasis upon loyalty and group identification.389

This is particularly so when hierarchy and status within the group are
as significant as they are in Japanese culture.
Similar themes emerge in Japanese human rights theory. Professor
Ishida, who has traced its development, noted that after the restoration,
but prior to the promulgation of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan
(Meiji Constitution), a “collectivity-realism” theory of law developed to
deal with questions of human rights: “The collective realism theory neglected the idea that a group is organized of individuals and, moreover,
387. CAROLYN S. STEVENS, ON THE MARGINS OF JAPANESE SOCIETY 16 (1997) (“In
Japanese society, group membership is the basis for individual identity . . . .”). See Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan
and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC. REV. 461, 465 (1986) (“Traditional Japanese
norms emphasize harmonious interpersonal relations and group solidarity. . . . Within a
group, maintenance of harmonious and smooth interpersonal relations, interdependence
and mutual trust are of utmost importance.”). See generally LEBRA, supra note 378, at
22–37.
388. Dag Leonardsen, The Impossible Case of Japan, 35 AUSTL. & N.Z. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 203, 220 (2002).
389. LEBRA, supra note 378, at 31–32.
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advocated the idea that the group existed as a natural organic body which
transcends individuals.”390
Professor Ishida further elaborated: “The group has an existence apart
from its members. This has similarity with the concept of ‘realism’ in the
philosophical sense, which is the doctrine that universals have real objective existence; therefore collectivity realism theory is the translation
used.”391 Ishida also observed a tendency to overemphasize the collectivity realism theory in the post-war era.392 In his discussion of the theoretical work of Yozo Watanabe, he commented:
[T]he important thing, from the viewpoint of fundamental human
rights, is the group’s decision-making process. Watanabe assumed the
group decision as though it had an organic nature. . . . [F]or example:
The rights and liberty of the group are at the foundation of the
rights and liberties of the individual. The destruction of the
freedom of the group is no more than destruction of the freedom of the individual. We must, therefore, place a guaranty of
freedom of group activity at the core of the problem of spiritual freedom in present days.393
390. Takeshi Ishida, Fundamental Human Rights and the Development of Legal
Thought in Japan, 8 LAW IN JAPAN 39, 52 (Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Beverly Braverman
trans., 1975).
391. Id. at 52 n.38.
392. Id. at 63.
393. Id. at 65 (citing Y. WATANABE, KEMPŌ TO GENDAI HŌGAKU 79 (1963)). Parker explains:
In other words, for the Japanese, one is one’s share in social relationships, not
metaphorically, but literally. . . . Understanding the Japanese conception of the
self as contextual helps us to understand . . . the beginning of a general explanation of the nature of the “mutual trust,” “personal interdependency,” and “group
harmony” which the Japanese value so much. In a society made up of “contextuals” rather than “individuals,” terms such as “trust” and “interdependence”
and “harmony” do not describe moral goals to be achieved by individuals; they
are rather part of the definition of what it means to be human and Japanese.
Parker, supra note 349, at 189. The question of the relationship of the individual to the
group is discussed at length in Hamaguchi Esyun, A Contextual Model of the Japanese:
Toward a Methodological Innovation in Japan Studies, 11 J. JAPAN. STUD. 289 (Kumon
Shumpei & Mildred R. Creighton trans., 1985). Hamaguchi notes:
It has also been argued that, in contrast to individual actors, the Japanese are
contextual actors participating in aidagara relationships. It has further been argued that this type of actorship is consistent with the Japanese social system, a
system of holonic decentralized control where spontaneous cooperation is essential. Such an evaluation is only a first step. If we can proceed to develop a
new general systems theory that lays a foundation for methodological contextualism, new horizons for Japan studies will be opened.
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Thus, it is possible to interpret the privacy interest mentioned by the
Court as an interest that the employer-employee corporate group has in
protecting the views and opinions of the employees from public disclosure. The right is a communal right of protection that belongs to the employer-employee group, not to the individual employees. Once the bond
of the group is broken (such as by the dissolution of the employer), the
group right is also broken. Hence, it is consistent to say that a right to
privacy might be implicated in the continuing business context of the
Fuji Bank, where the bond of the employer-employee corporate group
remains intact, but is not implicated in the case of the financial institution
that was dissolved.394
Moreover, it has been suggested that in post-modern industrial Japan,
the corporation has replaced the family and home village as the central
community for Japanese workers.395 More recently it has been postulated
that the corporate community is an aspect of Japan’s post-war modernization, which flows from the unique relationship of the Japanese company to both its shareholders and employees.396 As a consequence: “EmId. at 321. Takie Sugiyama Lebra describes the nature of collectivism:
The Japanese concern for belonging relates to the tendency towards collectivism, which is expressed by an individual’s identification with the collective
goal of the group to which he belongs. Collectivism thus involves cooperation
and solidarity . . . . What would be strictly a private matter in an individualistic
society tends to be a group enterprise in Japan.
LEBRA, supra note 378, at 25.
394. See Case. No. 15 of 2001, 55 MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001-Kyo-No.
15.html and supra notes 179–92 and accompanying text.
395. See HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 39, at 29. Hamilton and Sanders describe
this transformation:
The parallel between firm and family must be understood in light of the fact
that even the traditional family ie was as much a corporate group, an economic
unit, as it was a bloodline. Membership in an ie was to some extent determined
by who contributed to the economic welfare of the group. . . . Thus the Japanese household is both a descent group and a corporate group.
Id.
396. See Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Distributing Responsibility for Wrongdoing Inside Corporate Hierarchies: Public Judgments in Three Societies, 21 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 815, 827 (1996). Sanders and Hamilton describe the corporation-employee relationship:
Japanese employment policies reflect the relatively contextual nature of social
relationships. Lifetime employment for permanent employees in larger firms
ties workers to employers more closely than in the United States. Practices such
as tsukiui, the after-hours socializing among white-collar workers, and work-
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ployees of a firm identify themselves so strongly with the corporate
community that they lose their sense of being members of civil society
and become completely absorbed in their roles as members of the corporate community.” 397 Japanese corporations engage in a structured orientation of new employees that aims to socialize the new employee to the
corporate community. Thereafter, the lifetime employment system, the
seniority-based pay system, and the after-work socializing hours among
employees operate to cement the community.398
It has been suggested that Japanese corporate governance is based on
the concept of the corporate community:
The Company Community consists of management, board members,
and core employees, who share an identity as “company men.” In Japan, when people say “company,” it means the Company Community.
The Company Community provides a reason de etre to its members
and plays a role as a competing unit in the product market. Members of
the Company Community owe, in their psychological level, the duty of
loyalty to the Community itself and their fellow members.399
group activities such as quality circles produce an employment relationship
that is more like family relationships than is typically the case in the United
States. . . . For many Japanese workers the firm is not simply their place of employment but a community with which they identify.
397. Hirowatari, supra note 42, at 163. The strength of the concept of corporate community is reflected in questions and comments posed to Professor Millhaupt after his talk
on Choice as Regulatory Reform:
Q: . . . The concept of a company community is very strong and so far shareholders have never intervened. . . .
...
Q: Parent-subsidiary relationships are not the same as in the U.S. In Japan, even
100% subsidiaries organize their own communities. For the company community members of the subsidiary, the parent company is an outsider for them. . . .
...
Curtis Millhaupt, Professor, Columbia Law School, Speech at the BBL Seminar, Choice
as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance (May 12, 2004),
available at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/04051201.html.
398. See HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 39, at 67–70. For the importance of community in Japanese law, see JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND
THE JAPANESE PARADOX (1991) and HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55, at 134–40, 211; Luke
Nottage, Translating Tanese: Challenging Paradigms of Japanese Law and Society,
Seminar Paper Presented at Sho Sato Conference at Boalt Hall School of Law, Berkeley,
California (Feb. 12–13, 2005).
399. Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of the
Corporate Law and Their Solutions 16 (Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Work-
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It may be that privacy as used in corporate document production cases
is not the personal privacy that is common to American lawyers. Rather,
privacy may be viewed in the context of the corporation-employee group
relationship.400 In such a case, it is not a personal privacy interest401 of
the employee that is at stake, but rather a privacy interest of the employee as it relates to her relationship with the corporation.402 In essence,

ing Paper No. 23, 1999). See also TOYOHIRO KONO & STEWART R. CLEGG,
TRANSFORMATIONS OF CORPORATE CULTURE: EXPERIENCES OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISES
373–74 (1998).
400. See HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 39, at 55. Hamilton and Sanders explain
the importance of context as follows:
Japanese talk—and apparently think—about themselves as individuals in context. Thus it is hardly surprising that the philosopher Hajime Nakamura (1968)
boldly concludes that “Japanese in general did not develop a clear-cut concept
of the human individual qua individual as an objective unit like an inanimate
thing, but the individual is always found existing in a network of human relationships.”
Id.
401. See Burke, supra note 346, at 104–05. This notion of privacy is an aspect of what
Burke describes as “reciprocal duties and obligations”:
There is no disputing the fact of the existence of this family-centered group society. It is characterized by a “web” of reciprocal duties and obligations that
permeates all levels of society. In this web society, the individual has no real
existence outside his group. He lives only as a member of his family or community . . . .
Id. (citations omitted). See also Fukui, supra note 27, at 69 (“At least in Japanese society
. . . the binding of community is considerably solid compared with other modern societies.”).
402. Recent changes in Japan’s labor market may have the effect of eroding to some
degree the strong corporate community ties that have characterized Japan’s corporate
world. For example, Kazuo Sugeno explains:
Such supply-side changes of the labor market are influenced by the changing
values of workers. In contrast to workers during the growth periods of Japanese
economy, one finds workers in the recent low-growth years decreasingly identify themselves with their employer and increasingly desire respect for their
privacy and family life. This is particularly the case with younger workers.
These employees also criticize the egalitarian approach in the traditional seniority-based wage and promotion systems as unfair and inefficient. They thus support differentiation of treatment in accordance with the differences in performance and contribution. They request to have choices in jobs and career paths.
Harmonization of working life with workers’ private life is another frequent request. These phenomena have made the once-solid corporate community increasingly fragmented in its social control.
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employee-company privacy gives rise to a right on the part of the corporation (as the representative of the corporate community) not to produce
the document, but does not give rise to a corresponding right on the part
of the employee to prevent production of the document. Accordingly, the
corporate possessor of the document may waive the right and produce.
This principle would help to explain why only the corporate possessor of
the document and not the employee has standing to contest a production
order.403
And, as Professor Ishida noted, “the important thing, from the viewpoint of fundamental human rights, is the group’s decision-making process.”404 Similarly, Hall notes the “essential” nature of an open decisionmaking process to Japanese business and to the welfare of employees.405
Accordingly, to protect that decision-making process, it makes sense to
exempt from discovery documents that explore the process and disclose
the thoughts of the members of the corporate group participating in the
decision-making process.
Related to the need to protect the decision-making process is the need
to achieve consensus, i.e., harmony within the decision-making group, in
Kazuo Sugeno, The Birth of the Labor Tribunal System in Japan: A Synthesis of Labor
Law Reform and Judicial Reform, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 519, 523–24 (2004).
403. If the modern corporation-employee relationship is seen as a surrogate for the
feudal relationship, the employee’s privacy interest in matters relating to the corporation
is more easily understood as creating a right in the corporation that the employing corporation may rely on or waive, and not as an interest that can exist outside the corporationemployee relationship. For a discussion of the corporate community and the companycentered society, see Hirowatari, supra note 42, at 162–64.
404. Ishida, supra note 390, at 65.
405. HALL & HALL, supra note 378, at 82–83. Hall and Hall describe the collective
decision-making process in the corporate context as follows:
This process of collective decision-making allows everyone involved a chance
to review, evaluate, discuss, and approve or disapprove the proposal. This
process is absolutely essential. . . . Final decisions entail many, many meetings,
where all points of view are presented and discussed until consensus is
achieved. At every stage differences are reconciled. . . . It’s also important to
remember that in a system of lifetime employment in one of the major firms,
decisions that affect the future of the company have great personal impact on
each employee; he knows he will have to live with the results of these decisions.
Id. Hall and Hall also compare the closed-door, separate office of an American executive
with the bull-pen style offices of Japanese companies where the senior executives are
immediately available to others in the organization. Id. at 10 (“[N]ot only are other people constantly coming and going, both seeking and giving information, but the entire
form and function of the organization is centered on gathering, processing, and disseminating information.”).
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Japan.406 Achieving harmony may require that individuals compromise
their personal views to maintain a harmonious relationship with other
group members. Production of decision-making documents can adversely
affect the consensus-forming process, and has the added disadvantage of
disclosing that harmony might not in fact exist.407
Once the corporation is in the process of liquidation, the decisionmaking process of that corporate group is no longer sacrosanct—the
group bond has been broken. Accordingly, that group’s decision-making
document may be subject to discovery. Likewise, as protection of the
group process is the object of the exercise, once a decision has been
reached, the decision itself is not protected from disclosure. Hence, the
Supreme Court may allow production of the corporate document sent to
branch offices that recites the policy and determination of the firm, but
also protect the decision-making documents that led to that policy.408 It is
not the opinion of the individual employee that the employer seeks to
keep private. Rather, it is the opinion rendered to the ongoing entity or
group that must be protected. Once the group is disbanded, the employee
has no legitimate reason to have his opinions remain private.409
It is relevant to note that in the 2005 decision ordering production of
the factual material in a government labor investigation case, the employees of the company who had been interviewed by the investigators
406. See KONO & CLEGG, supra note 399, at 3 (“Within Japanese organizations it is the
extent and the substance of shared values that determine the members’ decision-making
patterns. . . . It is these patterns that we argue are at the core of corporate culture.”). Kono
and Clegg also emphasize the importance of shared information to the Japanese decisionmaking process and the importance of consensus and group decision-making. Id. at 374–
75, 380–81. See also ROBERT C. CHRISTOPHER, THE JAPANESE MIND 53 (1988) (“Probably
the single most important thing to know about Japanese is that they instinctively operate
on the principle of group consensus.”); HALL & HALL, supra note 378, at 81–82 (“Harmony and consensus are keystones of Japanese society.”); HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra
note 39, at 69 (“Authorities’ decision-making is also considerably more consensual in
Japanese firms than in their American counterparts.”); Dag Leonardsen, Crime in Japan:
Paradise Lost?, 7 J. SCANDINAVIAN STUD. CRIMINOLOGY CRIME PREVENTION 185, 206
(2006) (“Japan is a society based on consensus . . . .”).
407. See Dag Leonardsen, Crime in Japan—A Lesson for Criminological Theory? The
Cultural Dimension in Crime—What Can the Japanese Experience Tell Us? 9 (British
Society of Criminology Conference, Bangor, U.K., Paper, June 2003), http://www.brit
soccrim.org/volume6/008.pdf (“The concept of kaisha means group consciousness and
this group consciousness is all-important for Japanese citizens . . . . If one arranges the
value foundation of Japanese society hierarchically, the value of harmony within the
group is at the top.”).
408. See Case No. 39 of 2005, 60 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 2006), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.02.17-2005.-Kyo-.No..
39.html and supra notes 324–34 and accompanying text.
409. Id.
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had a shared interest with their company in objecting to the disclosure of
the report prepared by the government investigators.410 Unlike Fuji Bank,
in this case the information in the report was not internal to the group or
company. Rather, the information was disclosed because of a positive
obligation to disclose information to the higher group, namely the society
at large in the form of the government. No group privacy interest was
implicated because disclosures were not made in a group context. Likewise, no personal privacy interest was implicated as there was no way to
link the various opinions or factual statements to any specific employee.
Hence, no group decision-making interest was implicated. However, the
portion of the investigative report that disclosed the internal decisionmaking process of the Labor Department was deemed exempt from production.411 Indeed, Japan’s Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) specifically exempts from disclosure government documents containing “internal deliberations that would harm the free and frank exchange of opinions or hinder internal decision-making.”412
Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court of Japan may be supporting
the communal value and group norm of Japanese society when it implies
that a privacy interest exists when an ongoing firm (or government
agency)413 is asked to produce decision-making documents, but does not
410. See Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html and supra notes 276–90 and accompanying text.
411. Id. The Court explained:
The part of the Document relating to Information II contains information on the
decision-making process within the administrative authorities, and it is obvious
in light of its contents that there is a specific likelihood that this part might prevent the administrative authorities from making decisions without restrictions
and significantly hinder the performance of public duties when it is submitted
to the main case.
Id.
412. See DAVID BANISAR, PRIVACY INT’L, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AROUND THE
WORLD 2006 95, available at http://www.privacyinternational.org/foi/foisurvey2006.pdf.
413. The Japanese bureaucracy also operates on a lifetime employment system. Thus,
there exists a government equivalent of the corporate community that is present in the
private sector. See John O. Haley, Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis,
Address at Cornell University School of Law: Why Study Japanese Law? (Feb. 27, 2007)
(on file with author). Professor Haley describes this analogue:
A newly hired twenty-two year old assistant judge, newly recruited Ministry of
Finance official, Mitsubishi bank employee or Fuji Motors manager knew then
that thirty-five years hence at age 57 his (women were not included) and his
family’s welfare depended fundamentally on the political presence or prosperity of the organization they had joined. Lacking the possibility of exit, individ-
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protect a privacy interest once the community has been broken by the
dissolution (or pending dissolution) of the firm. Similarly, the communal
value may be protected when internal communications made in the decision-making process are protected. Group values are not adversely affected by the disclosure of communications containing policy determinations as to how the group should deal with the public from higher ranking members of the group to other group members. By leaving the parameters of the privacy interest vague, the Supreme Court allows itself
the opportunity to better define the scope of privacy at a future date when
a clearer consensus regarding privacy emerges in Japanese society.
It seems that both ongoing private employers and government agencies
may comfortably rely on the self-use exception when the decisionmaking advice from its employees is the subject of a document production motion. The Court seems clear in holding that private and public
employers must be allowed to receive the uncensored opinions of staff
and must be assured that employees can freely engage in the decisionmaking process without the concern that those opinions or ideas will be
used to the company’s disadvantage in litigation.
ual Japanese had (and I believe still have) little choice but to pursue the collective interest of the public agency, the firm or family business to which they had
tied their future.
Id. See also John O. Haley, Whence, What and Whither Japan, 19 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 473, 479–80 (1998) (reviewing TROUBLED INDUSTRIES: CONFRONTING
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN JAPAN (Robert M. Uriu ed., 1996) and JAPANESE LABOUR AND
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION: DIVERSITY, FLEXIBILITY AND PARTICIPATION (Mari Sako &
Hiroki Sato eds., 1997)); TAKIE SUGIYAMA LEBRA, supra note 378, at 31–32.
To some degree, the ties within a government community may be even stronger
than those in the purely private sector, as mandatory retirement from government may
come at an earlier age than in the private sector, necessitating post-government employment through agency assistance. See BRIAN WOODALL, JAPAN UNDER CONSTRUCTION:
CORRUPTION, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC WORKS 140 (1996) (“The lifetime employment and
amakudari systems also offer fierce disincentives for would-be whistle-blowers. Since
the post retirement prospects of government officials relate directly to the level and prestige of their final posting in the bureaucracy, officials do whatever it takes to secure promotion.”). Kono and Clegg describe the role of lifetime employment policies in Japan as
follows:
In Japan, male organization members are expected to devote themselves to the
organization, sacrificing their leisure and home life for the obligations that the
company assumes. . . . The obligation that respect for people must be behind
the policies that the organization assumes supports organization members in
their devotion to the organization. Lifetime employment is one of these policies.
KONO & CLEGG, supra note 399, at 371.
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The cases do not address the potential interaction between the in camera and redaction rights of the Court and a plaintiff’s need for production
of facts as distinguished from opinions or advice. In other words, would
the free flow of in-house ideas and communications be subverted if factual material was produced, even if the opinions of staff were redacted?
In at least one case the Court has made such a distinction—when it exempted opinions and techniques of government investigators in its order
requiring production of material obtained by the government investigators from interviews with employees of the company.414 The factual material encompassed by the order did not meet the self-use exception because it did not constitute a government secret and was not directly connected to a specific employee. Thus, no personal privacy interest was at
stake.
It may be that a similar rule will arise in the private company production arena; however, the employer-employee group relationship may be
so inviolable that even a redacted version of internal communications
would be deemed unpalatable. While the scope of the group privacy right
is untested, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the free flow of information within an ongoing business entity may mean that all decisionmaking documents prepared solely for use within the company are immune from production, even if the material is simply factual in nature or
merely records policies or decisions.
Among the types of disadvantage that might be utilized to support the
self-use exception are the common privileges, such as the trade secret or
attorney-client privileges. Still, the cases to date suggest that more is required than simply the possessor’s statement that a privilege or secret is
involved. The Court has required a searching inquiry into whether the
material involved is truly secret or privileged. For example, the manufacturer who argued that its schematic was a secret could nonetheless be
ordered to produce the schematic unless it could show that it would suffer some disadvantage as a consequence of production, thus demonstrating it was indeed a trade secret.415 Similarly, the insurance administrator
414. See Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html and supra notes 276–90 and accompanying text.
415. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No.
20.html and supra notes 136–54 and accompanying text. Under Japanese law, a news
reporter may refuse to identify sources under the professional secrets privilege of article
197 of the 1996 Code. See MINSOHŌ, art. 197, para. 2. However, this privilege is not
absolute and in determining whether the reporter may refuse to testify, the court must
balance factors such as the significance of the news report, the manner in which the reporter gathered the information, and the effect that disclosure would have on future re-
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could not invoke attorney-client privilege to avoid production when the
attorney was merely an investigation commission member, not a lawyer
for the insurance company.416 This principle is consistent with the
Court’s treatment of official or state secrets in documents held by the
government. In this context, the court must make a searching examination into the validity of the government’s rationale for refusing production. A court is unlikely to substitute its judgment for that of government,
but it will require a reasoned explanation that is within the realm of discretion afforded the official refusing production.
C. Cultural Values Affecting Unresolved Issues—Third Party Document
Creators
In article 220, the Code refers to the exclusive use of the document by
the possessor of the document but does not specify whether the possessor
must also be creator of the document.417 If the creator of the document is
not also the corporation-possessor, does the self-use exception apply? In
Fuji Bank, the Court discussed preparation only in terms of its ultimate
use, i.e., whether the document was intended for internal use only. Fuji
Bank did not consider the questions raised by third party document creators, as the documents in that case were internally created. The issue will

porting activities against the nature of the suit and its value to society, the importance of
the testimony, and whether alternative means of proving the relevant fact are available.
See Case No. 19 of 2006, 59 MINSHŪ (Sup. Ct., Oct. 3, 2006), translation available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.10.03-2006.-Kyo-.No..19.html. The
reference by the Court to the manner in which the reporter obtained the information may
relate to an earlier decision by the Court upholding a reporter’s conviction in a case
where a news reporter was found to have overstepped the line of what was culturally
acceptable when he obtained material for his report through a sexual relationship with a
source and ended the affair after obtaining the report information. See Nishiyama v. Japan, 32 KEISHU 457 (Sup. Ct., May 31, 1978), translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER &
HIRSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 543, 545
(1996). Nishiyama involved a report that there had been a secret deal between the United
States and Japan regarding the payment of certain costs relating to the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Id. The government denied that there was any such deal. In 2000 and
2002, the United States government released files indicating that the reporter’s story may
have been accurate. Id. Nishiyama sued, arguing that the government had illegally convicted him and had ruined his reputation. Id. In March 2007, the Tokyo District Court
dismissed the action based on the twenty-year statute of limitations. See Reporter Fails to
Clear Name over ‘72 Scoop, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 28, 2007.
416. See Case No. 14 of 2004, 58 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2004), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.11.26-2004-Kyo-No..
14.html and supra notes 193–203 and accompanying text.
417. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(d).
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inevitably arise, and the principles reviewed thus far do, nonetheless,
provide some guidance as to how a court would approach the issue.
Japanese companies make extensive use of business consultants. Production of a consultant’s reports could be at least as damaging to the free
flow of decision-making materials as the disclosure of documents in Fuji
Bank would have been. While outside consultants do not participate in
the employer-employee corporate community, they do share some commonality with the community. At least for the duration of the project for
which they have been engaged, the outside consultant may reasonably be
considered as a part of the “corporate team.” In this sense, a document
created by a third party could be viewed as user-created. Moreover, a
strict interpretation of the self-use exception, which requires commonality between the creator and possessor, might chill the use of independent
examination at the very time when statutory auditors (who, in Japan, audit all activities of the company, not simply its accounting or financial
functions) are being phased out in favor of independent directors.418 In
this context, cooperation with independent investigators is not subject to
fine or potential criminal penalty, as is the case in a government investigation. Thus, independent investigators truly rely on the cooperation of
company employees and interviewees to perform their investigative
function. Such cooperation could well be compromised if the report were
subject to production in litigation.
Similarly, to require production of advice documents from independent
consultants would force companies to perform such functions in-house.
When those functions are better performed by outside consultants, it
could have a detrimental effect on the entire corporate community. In
cases where an independent investigation or consultant’s report has been
prepared for use exclusively by the company commissioning the project,

418. Prior to 2006, Japanese corporations were required to appoint statutory auditors.
See SHŌHŌ [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, arts. 273–280, translated in EHS
LAW BULL. SER. no. 2200 (2001). In response to the economic downturn of the 1990s, the
Commercial Code was amended to permit a more Americanized board of directors structure under which outside directors (i.e., directors who are not employees of the corporation) would serve on boards of large corporations. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance, 53
AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 344 (2005). The board would monitor the affairs of the company
and the operations would be carried out by corporate executives. Id. at 353. Corporations
utilizing the outside director system could also adopt a committee system, provided the
committees’ composition consisted of a majority of outside directors. Id. at 352–53.
Companies adopting the outside director system could do away with the statutory auditor
positions. Id.
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it is likely that a court would treat such a report as it would treat an internally-created document.419
An even more likely scenario is where the party for whose exclusive
use the document was prepared distributes the document externally to
obtain advice from a consultant. In such a case, can the possessor successfully invoke the self-use exception? In Fuji Bank, the Court did discuss the fact that, when the document was prepared, the possessor did not
anticipate that it would ultimately be disclosed to outsiders.420 But the
Court in Fuji Bank did not contemplate a scenario in which a document
might be sent to a consultant as part of a decision-making process. In
such a case, this out-of-house consultant should be deemed in-house for
purposes of the self-use exception because she performs the same function as an in-house employee.
Since Japanese companies have different stakeholders and stakeholder
relationships than do American firms, it is possible to imagine a variety
of scenarios not addressed by Fuji Bank.421 What if the out-of-house possessor is a related company—perhaps the lead bank for the preparer of
the document? What if the lead bank prepared the report for the use of
the possessor? Are members of a corporate group like members of a political faction who receive research reports prepared by the faction?422 In
the case discussed above, the faction members that received the report
were not the preparers, nor was the faction an incorporated group. Nevertheless, the faction members arguably represented a group that, like the
419. Of course, the court has the authority to order third persons, i.e. not parties to
litigation, to produce documents. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, paras. 1–2.
420. See Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2.
html.
421. Milhaupt, supra note 57, at 19–22. Milhaupt explains this difference:
[L]arge independent shareholders and groups of interconnected institutions, not
dispersed individuals, have characterized Japanese shareholding patterns . . . .
[C]apital investment seldom represents the totality of the relationship between
shareholders and the managers who concededly control the corporation even in
Japan. . . . [S]hareholder-oriented corporate organs and mechanisms have traditionally played little role in the life of the Japanese firm. . . . As career-long
employees themselves, Japanese managers pursue employee welfare at least as
vigorously as shareholder interests. . . . Strong institutions characterized by
highly relational interaction form the key constraints: main banks, keiretsu corporate groups, enduring firm-specific employment patterns.
Id.
422. See Case No. 2 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 9 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.11.10-2005.-Gyo-Fu.No..2.html.
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corporate community, was entitled to the free-flow of information so that
faction decisions could be made with all information available to all
members. This principle, to the extent it applied to members of a political
faction, should apply to consultants and other important players in the
Japanese corporate context.
Another possible factual scenario within this third-party issue is how a
holding company will be treated by a court. Now that holding companies
are once again permissible in Japan, is a court to consider all members of
the holding company structure as a single possessor?423 Is there a difference between the parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary and a parent of a
partially-owned subsidiary? Should the Japanese legal system adopt an
analysis similar to that found in the American Copperweld case and its
progeny?424 The Court is unlikely to enter this arena. Instead, the Court
will likely adopt a general rule that treats all members of the holding
company as one for purposes of possessor analysis. The determining factors will likely be whether the possessor for whose benefit the document
was made will be significantly injured, and whether the entity to whom
the document was sent and who is in possession would, as a matter of
Japanese norm, be considered an appropriate entity to receive the document. It is unlikely that technical questions of the juridical relationship of
preparer and possessor will be considered.
It seems clear that only the possessor ordered to produce or the requestor denied production have standing to appeal a production order.425
Thus, if the document is in the hands of a third person who is not a party
to the litigation, the party whose cause might be hurt by production lacks
standing to appeal the production order. But does such party have stand423. See Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kōsei Torihiki no Kakuho ni kansuru
Hōritsu [Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act], Law. No. 54 of 1947, translation available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf; Andrew
H. Thorson & Frank Siegfanz, The 1997 Deregulation of Japan’s Holding Companies, 8
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 261, 263 (1999) (explaining that pure holding companies had
been banned for fifty years).
424. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 742, 767 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that there was an economic unity between a parent corporation and a
wholly owned subsidiary because there was only one economic actor and only one economic mind. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 742, 767–77
(1984). Thus, the parent and subsidiary could not conspire to violate the antitrust laws. Id.
at 777. See also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); Jack Russell Terrier Network
of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d. 1027 (9th Cir. 2005) (economic unity test
applied in a Sherman Act Section 1 case where separate entities had common objective
and were not competitors).
425. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
35.html and supra notes 155–69 and accompanying text.
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ing to object to the request for production in the first instance? Does the
lack of standing to appeal mean that the party has no standing to raise the
self-use exception when a motion to order production has been made?
After all, the party is not the possessor, and if the possessor of the document has no objection to production, why should the party have any right
to object? The answer may lie in the nature of “voluntary” production by
a third person.
If a third person possesses a document, he may volunteer that document to a party to use in litigation, assuming no other legal bar exists,
such as a confidentiality agreement. On the other hand, a third person in
possession of a document may be unwilling to produce without a court
order, even when they have no objection to production. The order, issued
by government authority, may provide the needed societal lubricant for
the possessor, who would otherwise be seen as volunteering to produce.
Since Japanese courts lack general injunctive powers, a determination by
the court not to enter an order requiring production does not obligate the
third person possessor to refuse to voluntarily produce. Nonetheless, if
the requestor resorted to the court, it is likely that a court’s refusal to enter such an order (or to suggest that production be made) would have a
chilling effect on attempts by the requestor to obtain voluntary production. In such a situation, it makes sense for the objecting party to present
its objections to the court. Limiting the right to make such arguments to
the first-level trial court is consistent with the Supreme Court’s determination that only the possessor ordered to produce or the requestor denied
production may appeal to the High Court.426
D. Reconciling the Freedom of Information Act and the 1996 Code
The Supreme Court has interpreted the 1996 Code to be less lenient on
the government and has required production even when state secrets are
involved. These cases may be instructive when the Japanese Freedom of
Information Act is tested in the Supreme Court.427 Under the FOIA:
426. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No..
35.html. Allowing the party adversely affected to present its position to the District Court
is also consistent with article 223 of the 1996 Code, which allows an entity whose private
secret is in government possession an opportunity to object when the secret would be
revealed if the document request were granted. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223.
427. See Gyōsei kikan no hōyūsuru jōhō no kōkai ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Concerning
Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs], Law No. 42 of 1999, art. 5,
translation available at http://www.soumu.go.jp/gyoukan/kanri/translation4.htm. Article
6 contains provisions under which certain information may be partially disclosed and
partially withheld. Id. art. 6.
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There are six broad categories of exemptions. Documents can be withheld if they contain information about a specific individual unless the
information is made public by law or custom, is necessary to protect a
life, or relates to a public official in his public duties; corporate information that risks harming its interests and was given voluntarily in confidence; information that puts national security or international relations or negotiations at risk; information that would hinder law enforcement; internal deliberations that would harm the free and frank
exchange of opinions or hinder internal decision-making; business of a
public organ relating to inspection and supervision, contracts, research,
personnel management, or business enterprise. Exempted information
can be disclosed by the head of the agency “when it is deemed that
there is a particular public-interest need.” The head of the agency can
also refuse to admit the existence of the information if answering the
request will reveal the information.428

Article 220 of the Code also specifically exempts government documents from production, providing that it is: “a document containing official secrets held by public officials, which is likely to harm the public
interest or significantly hinder the performance of public duties when it
is produced.”429 Yet to be worked out by the Supreme Court is the relationship between the FOIA and the requirements for production of government-held documents.430
The Supreme Court has held that company secrets disclosed to the labor investigators in the course of an investigation became government
secrets once integrated into the investigator’s report.431 The secrets in428. See BANISAR, supra note 412. Of particular relevance here is article 5(5), which
exempts from disclosure “information concerning deliberations, examinations, or consultations internal to or between either organs of the State . . . [or] local public entities . . .
that, if made public, would risk unjustly harming the frank exchange of opinions or the
neutrality of decision making . . . .” MINSOHŌ, art. 5, para. 5.
429. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(b). This code language is quoted by two Supreme
Court cases. See Case No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22,
2005), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.
22-2005.-Gyo-Fu-.No..4.html; Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14,
2005), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.
14-2005.-Kyo-.No..11.html.
430. For a discussion of the needs for greater disclosure in Japan, see C. Raj Kumar,
Corruption in Japan—Institutionalizing the Right to Information, Transparency and the
Right to Corruption-Free Governance, 10 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2004).
431. Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html. The Court held:
“Official secrets held by public officials” thus construed should be deemed to
include not only secrets relating to affairs under the control of public officials
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volved in that case did not implicate the FOIA because they were not
given to the investigators voluntarily (the Labor Law compelled disclosure), nor were they given in confidence.432 But it is easy to contemplate
a situation where private information is given voluntarily yet is also confidential. While exempt from general public disclosure under the FOIA,
would this kind of private secret be converted into a public secret exempt
from production? It is likely that a court’s analysis would turn on
whether disclosure by the government would adversely affect the government’s ability to carry out its public interest functions.
While the Court has concluded that an employer could not refuse to
cooperate with the government when the law requires disclosure,433 the
analysis could change where the information is given voluntarily. The
principle expounded by the High Court—namely that disclosure would
restrict the government’s access to information, injuring its ability to perform its functions—would apply, rendering disclosure in this context
inappropriate.434
but also secrets of private persons that public officials came to know in the performance of their duties, which are likely to damage the relationships between
the public officials and the private persons and hinder fair and smooth operation of public duties when they are disclosed.
Article 223 of the 1996 Code recognizes a right for the government to refuse to
produce private secrets contained in government documents and also gives the
private party whose technical or business secrets might be disclosed an opportunity to present its reasons for non-disclosure.
Id. (citing MINSOHŌ, art. 223).
432. See Gyōsei kikan no hōyūsuru jōhō no kōkai ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Concerning
Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs], Law No. 42 of 1999, art. 5, para.
2(b), translation available at http://www.soumu.go.jp/gyoukan/kanri/translation4.htm.
433. See Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No..
11.html.
434. Id. The Court reasoned:
[I]t cannot be denied that if, when workers and subcontractors have provided
information on industrial accidents, the fact that they provide information or the
contents of the information were easily made public, some of such persons
concerned would provide the investigators in charge with only insufficient information, for fear of reprisals of the employer disadvantaged by the provision
of information. . . . Therefore, the disclosure of the Document would damage
the relationships of trust between the workers and the Investigators in Charge,
which seems likely to hinder the investigators from hearing statements of the
persons concerned, an extremely important duty for identifying the safety control system at workplaces and the cause of accident in similar types of accident
investigation.
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Article 220 of the 1996 Code defines the categories of documents that
are subject to court-ordered production, illustrating that document production is neither automatic nor, like the United States system, under the
parties’ control. In Japan, production is a matter of court order.435 Article
223 of the 1996 Code, which deals with court orders, specifically requires that the government be given notice and the opportunity to object
when a party seeks production of government documents.436 The government is then given an opportunity to object to the production. Article
223 also contains special exemption provisions for government documents, one of which tracks one of the six FOIA exemptions: “[t]he
document is likely to impair national security, harm the relationships of
trust with foreign countries or international organizations, or put Japan at
a disadvantage in negotiation with foreign countries or international organizations.”437
While the FOIA does not contain a provision allowing a court on an
appeal of an FOIA determination to conduct an in camera review of the
materials requested, the 1996 Code does. Under article 223, the court has
authority to examine reasons given by the government supporting its objection to production and should deny production if there is good reason
for the official’s position. In making this determination, the 1996 Code
directs the court to conduct an in camera examination of the document at
issue so that it can evaluate the reason given against the information contained in the document.438 Although the Supreme Court has yet to apply
article 223 to order production, it has indicated that the government must
have sufficient and good reasons to refuse document production. It appears that while production of government documents is not to be rejected lightly, good reasons must be submitted to the court to sustain
such a finding. It is likely that the government has received this message
and it will be easier for future litigants to obtain government documents
when there is no state secret involved.439 Or, at least it will be more diffiId. The High Court noted that the employee’s concern was not with personal privacy, but
with reprisal against their employer. Id. This reflects the need to protect the corporate
community.
435. Although the Code calls for court orders to produce documents, it is more likely
that the court will request that the documents be produced, using its authority to compel
only if necessary. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223.
436. See id. art. 223.
437. Id.
438. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, paras. 3–5.
439. This being said, it does not mean that the government will not try to devise new
means for avoiding production of documents it wishes to keep confidential. With the
passage of a privacy law designed to protect certain personal privacy interests of individuals from disclosure by private corporations, it is likely that the government will make
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cult for the government to withhold documents on the basis of government secrets than has been the case in the past.
CONCLUSION
Fuji Bank appeared to be a major setback to those who sought a more
relaxed standard for production, but the decision aligns with Japanese
norms of community and harmonious decision making. Fuji Bank
changed the pre-1996 Code judicial interpretation of what constituted a
self-use document and implicitly rejected the views of Professors Taniguchi and Mochizuki that the 1996 Code changed the presumption that a
document should be produced. Since Fuji Bank, the Court’s decisions
appear to both protect the decision-making functions of the corporate
community while also furthering and strengthening the norms of harmony and community within the corporation. The Supreme Court’s focus
on and protection of the sanctity of decision-making documents is consistent with the historic and cultural values of the Tokugawa village and
feudal family structure and reinforces their analogies in their modern
surrogate, the corporate employer in a lifetime employment system.
Clearly, distribution of internal memos is an important part of the free
flow of information within an organization that is important to the proper
functioning of the entity. The free flow of information can positively affect morale, sales, manufacturing, and much more. All of these positive
effects may flow even when the information sent does not implicate privacy concerns or disclose trade secrets. Yet, the Court, in its decision
allowing production of a bank’s internal correspondence setting out bank
policy, does not explore whether the production of the documents might
adversely effect the free flow of information from management to employees or from the home office to branches.440 If production adversely
affects the free flow of information within the organization, it might very
well cause the company to restrict the type and volume of information
the company shared between head offices, branches, management, and
employees. The Court seems focused solely on the free flow of information for decision-making purposes, the fact pattern found in Fuji Bank.
greater use of the exemption from the FOIA where information about a specific individual (e.g., a government official or employee) is involved. See Kojin jōhō no hogo ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on the Protection of Personal Privacy], Law No. 57 of 2003, translation
available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APPI.pdf. See also FRESHFIELDS
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION LAW (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2007/sept12/19861.pdf.
440. Case No. 39 of 2005, 60 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 2006), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.02.17-2005.-Kyo-.No..
39.html.
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This focus exposes some internal administrative documents to production
orders—but it also protects the Japanese norms of community and harmony in decision-making.
Similarly, the Court allowed production of factual information in investigative reports that have the public interest as their ultimate goal—in
a decision about a government labor investigation, and in another decision dealing with an investigative report prepared for the administrator of
a failed insurance company.441 In both cases, although the subject of the
investigation did not instigate the investigation, the public interest served
by the investigation was a major factor in the Court’s decisions. Where a
company commissions an external independent investigation to serve
both a company goal (e.g., restoring public confidence in the company)
and a public goal (e.g., protecting the public from a potentially unsafe
product), the preparer and possessor will be different juridical entities.
Recognizing the legal difference between the preparer and possessor of
the document, as well as the public interest in the investigation report,
would allow courts to order production of at least some information in
independent investigative reports.
On the other hand, ordering production of investigative reports, as a
general matter, could spell the end of outside independent investigations
and could inhibit the free flow of material that company executives need
to make decisions. How the Court will expand or restrict these outside
investigative reports in the private sector remains to be seen. Perhaps the
Court will develop an ad hoc rule based on the undefined special circumstances exception in Fuji Bank, enabling it to protect the free flow of decision-making information to management while recognizing the public’s need for factual information in some circumstances.
Additionally, the Court appears to have relaxed the definition of a relationship document to include documents that are not mutually executed
by the parties and to include some of the documents underlying the creation of the relationship. The provision of article 220 of the 1996 Code
that allows a party access to documents where that right is secured in
substantive law, has also been relaxed. Thus, although there may not be a
specific statutory provision that grants a party a right to have a document
produced, it may be sufficient that one party has a legal duty to keep records, and refusing access to those records would be a breach of good
faith or an abuse of rights—especially if there is administrative guidance
to permit access.
441. See Case No. 14 of 2004, 58 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2004), translation
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.11.26-2004-Kyo-No..
14.html and supra notes 193–203 and accompanying text.
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It must be remembered that what is at stake in these cases is not discovery in the American legal sense, but production of documents. A
party seeking production still has a high hurdle when making a case for
production of documents. Most smoking gun documents are likely to be
related to decision making, and thus fall within the self-use exception.
Still, the recent cases are a departure from the more restricted rule of Fuji
Bank, a literal reading of the 1996 Code, and diverge from the Old
Code’s judicial doctrine of self-use. The Supreme Court’s emerging doctrine, while somewhat opening production to administrative corporate
documents, keeps the door closed to the production of decision-making
documents, both of which further the cultural value of community in the
corporate setting.
It remains to be seen how far the Supreme Court will go in liberalizing
the document production rules. It is likely that additional cases dealing
with the interpretation of the 1996 Code will be forthcoming. Meanwhile, lower courts, especially those that have previously shown themselves to be more accommodating to document production than the Supreme Court, may well read these recent cases as allowing them greater
discretion in ordering parties to produce documents. As the Japanese
courts cautiously proceed to define the boundaries of document production under the 1996 Code, it is likely that the notions of context, custom,
and community will continue to guide the doctrine.

